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I. INTRODUCTION 
Most publicly traded securities, and in particular those traded in the 
financial markets of most advanced economies, are held by investors1 
through securities accounts maintained by intermediaries such as 
stockbrokers, banks, and central securities depositories (CSDs)2—
 
 1. This article generally refers to an “investor” as the legal or beneficial owner of 
securities or other financial assets. 
 2. See generally INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW 
(UNIDROIT), UNIDROIT LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES xxii (2017) 
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE GUIDE], https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/capital-markets/legi
slative-guide [https://perma.cc/E9ZJ-BZEY] (describing a Central Securities Depository, or 
CSD) (“[A]n entity that provides the initial recording of securities in a book-entry system or 
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intermediated securities.  For many investors, this is the only practical 
means of holding and dealing with securities.  The infrastructures currently 
in use in these markets make intermediated holding through intermediaries 
essential and foreclose the option of direct holding on the books of 
securities issuers. 
These intermediated holding infrastructures impose a variety of risks 
and costs.  But they persist as the only practical means for these investors 
to hold securities primarily because this is the way the systems currently 
work.3  The primary beneficiaries of these systems—the intermediaries 
themselves—have resisted fundamental changes in the holding systems.  I 
argue here that the mere existence of these holding systems, and the 
benefits enjoyed by their principal architects, do not reflect an appropriate 
public policy justification for maintaining and accepting the investor and 
systemic risks and costs (including costs of reducing and managing these 
risks) that they impose. 
This article presents a comprehensive analysis and assessment of legal 
attributes and implications of intermediated securities holding 
infrastructures.  Unlike earlier studies discussed below, this more holistic 
study identifies and considers the significant legal and regulatory aspects of 
intermediated holding systems.  Moreover, it sharply distinguishes the risks 
and costs imposed by intermediated holding systems from those attendant 
to the trading of securities and the settlement of trades.  It explains that an 
optional disintermediated holding system is compatible with the 
maintenance of legacy trading and settlement structures, perhaps as a 
minimally disruptive interim measure.4  This approach recognizes and 
confronts the political economy and path dependency impediments to a 
more disruptive and comprehensive disintermediation of financial market 
infrastructures. 
These securities holding infrastructures are complex and arcane.  This 
likely accounts, at least in part, for their persistence and resistance to 
 
that provides and maintains the securities accounts at the top tier of the intermediated 
holding chain.  The entity may provide additional services such as clearing, settlement and 
processing corporate actions.  It plays an important role in helping to ensure the integrity of 
securities issues.”); UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated 
Securities, UNIDROIT (Oct. 9, 2009) [hereinafter GSC], http://www.unidroit.org/instrumen
ts/capital-markets/geneva-convention [https://perma.cc/WV6Z-7BZG] (reflecting an 
important and emerging international consensus, or common understanding, as to many 
aspects of intermediated securities). 
 3. See text at notes 59–62. 
 4. Reference to “disintermediation” here generally refers to the adoption of direct, 
transparent holding systems.  For a discussion of “direct” versus “indirect” and 
“transparent” versus “nontransparent” holding systems.  See infra Part II. 
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regulatory reforms.  One benefit to which this study aspires is to make the 
invisible visible.  While it does not undertake an empirical cost-benefit 
analysis, the study does provide a useful framework for that analysis. 
This article proposes a holding structure that would reduce 
intermediary risk and, along the way, would ameliorate several other 
problematic attributes of current intermediated securities holding 
infrastructures.  I refer to this approach as the “new platform” system 
(NPS).  The NPS would connect the holdings of participating investors 
directly to the issuers of securities—disintermediated or “direct” holding.  
This approach would reduce or eliminate intermediary risk imposed by 
these holding infrastructures in relevant domestic markets, and also would 
facilitate the shortening of custody chains across international borders.  
Disintermediation of holding structures is fully compatible with retaining 
the many essential roles of intermediaries and intermediation in contexts 
such as trading on exchanges or other trading platforms, and the clearing 
and settlement of securities transactions.5  The discussion here focuses 
primarily on examples drawn from the relevant prevailing financial 
infrastructures, legal rules, and market practices in the United States.  
United States law, regulation, and market infrastructure exemplifies a 
relatively “pure” version of a nontransparent intermediated holding 
system.6  But the NPS and the discussion of intermediated holding have 
global relevance. 
Implementing the disintermediation of securities holding under the 
NPS would require modifications of current holding infrastructures, but 
fundamental changes may be on the horizon in any event.7  The global 
financial markets—such as the markets for securities, derivatives, and the 
broad penumbra of financial products around each—are not only complex, 
but also are constantly and rapidly evolving.  Much of this market 
complexity is a necessary result of the wide variety of market participants, 
financial products, legal and regulatory regimes that persist, the 
corresponding financial market infrastructures that have emerged globally 
to serve these markets, and the reality that the financial markets are global 
and interconnected across national borders. 
Financial technology, or FinTech,8 is at the forefront of this rapid 
 
 5. See infra pp. 41–46 (discussing operation of the NPS following trading and 
settlement processes). 
 6. See infra notes 44–45 and accompanying text (discussing “omnibus” account 
holding systems). 
 7. See note 302 and accompanying text (adding that the emergence of Fintech may 
facilitate basic changes in securities holding infrastructures). 
 8. See Julia Kagan, Financial Technology – Fintech, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), ht
390 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 22:2 
 
evolution.  As George Walker has summarized this phenomenon: 
FinTech has emerged as a powerful new market force as a result 
of the coming together of a number of disconnected trends.  
Significant advances have occurred in the areas of computer and 
digital technology, the Internet, mobile telecommunications as 
well as economics and finance, which have transformed 
traditional areas of study and created important potential new 
business structures and operations.9  
This article focuses on FinTech in the specific context of 
intermediated securities.  It aspires to harness the momentum of FinTech to 
address and overcome a host of persistent risks, costs, and inefficiencies 
that arise from the central attribute of intermediated holding systems—
intermediation itself. 
Much of the current FinTech discussion and experimentation focuses 
on “blockchain” technology, which is a subset of distributed ledger 
technology, or DLT.10  This technology has been most commonly 
associated with Bitcoin, a digital currency (or “cryptocurrency”) platform.11  
While Bitcoin may be the most visible and publicized blockchain system in 
operation to date, DLT proponents have been eager to move the 
conversation beyond digital currencies and towards the utility and 
adaptation of DLT in other areas of FinTech.  Indeed, many of the most 
important financial market participants have already commenced 
investments and experimentation in DLT and expressed strong interest in 
DLT as an important component of FinTech’s future.12  The concept of 
 
tp://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fintech.asp#ixzz4aZxr0YMG [https://perma.cc/7KC4-Y
2M3] (describing the expansion of the term Fintech to include any technological innovation 
in the financial sector, including innovations in financial literacy and education, retail 
banking, investment and even crypto-currencies, like Bitcoin). 
 9. George Walker, Financial Technology Law—A New Beginning and a New Future, 
50 INT’L LAW. 137 (2017). 
 10. See generally Luke Fortney, Blockchain Explained, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 10, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blockchain.asp [https://perma.cc/R6G6-CFH2] 
(providing an overview of the technical mechanics underlying blockchain technology). 
 11. See Scott Likens, Making Sense of Bitcoin, Cryptocurrency and Blockchain, 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (Mar. 24, 2019), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/financi
al-services/fintech/bitcoin-blockchain-cryptocurrency.html [https://perma.cc/J6A8-5L92] 
(defining each of the relevant technologies and their interconnection with each other). 
 12. See generally Prableen Bajpai, How Stock Exchanges Are Experimenting with 
Blockchain Technology, NASDAQ (June 12, 2017), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/how-stoc
k-exchanges-are-experimenting-with-blockchain-technology-cm801802 [https://perma.cc/A
L9R-R2P7] (discussing the ways in which stock exchanges around the world are 
experimenting with blockchain); see also Australian Sec. & Invs. Comm’n, ASX Media 
Release – ASX Selects Distributed Ledger Technology to Replace CHESS, ASX (Dec. 7, 
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facilitating securities trades with DLT has also been well received in 
corporate law, in principle, if not in practice; the state of Delaware now 
allows corporations to maintain corporate records, including shareholder 
lists, and transfers of stock on a distributed ledger database.13  To date the 
many claims and predictions that DLT will produce radical and profound 
changes in the financial markets reflect more hype and hope than actual 
happenings.14 
In the FinTech space, the DLT-related initiatives and discussions by 
and among important financial market institutions have emphasized the 
potential efficiency gains—in effect, allowing existing institutions to do 
what they do now better.  For example, a thoughtful and balanced white 
paper by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) identified 
DLT’s potential for enforcing industry standards, enhancing operational 
efficiencies, reducing time and risk in completing transactions, providing 
beneficial transparency, and improvement in security for processes and 
data.15  Of course, improvements in all of these areas would benefit all 
 
2017), https://www.asx.com.au/documents/investor-relations/ASX-selects-distributed-ledg
er-technology-to-replace-CHESS.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQ34-GQMA] (announcing that the 
Australian Securities Exchange is in the process of replacing its post-trade clearing and 
settlement system with a blockchain-based system). 
 13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 224 (2017). 
 14. See, e.g., DTCC, EMBRACING DISRUPTION: TAPPING THE POTENTIAL OF DISTRIBUTED 
LEDGERS TO IMPROVE THE POST-TRADE LANDSCAPE 2 (2016) [hereinafter, DTCC Report] 
(“DTCC believes that distributed ledger technologies have the potential to address certain 
limitations of the current post-trade process by modernizing, streamlining and simplifying 
the siloed design of the financial industry infrastructure with a shared fabric of common 
information.”); Alex Tapscott & Don Tapscott, How Blockchain Is Changing Finance, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 1, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/how-blockchain-is-changing-finan
ce [https://perma.cc/JKP8-F7GZ] (“The unstoppable force of blockchain technology is 
barreling down on the infrastructure of modern finance.  As with prior paradigm shifts, 
blockchain will create winners and losers.”); How Blockchain Will Impact the Financial 
Sector, SWIFT INST. (Nov. 15, 2018), https://swiftinstitute.org/download/how-blockchain-w
ill-impact-the-financial-sector/ [https://perma.cc/Q2WV-C3PU] (referencing a Wharton 
Professor’s prediction) (“[Blockchain’s] power of eliminating intermediaries is the ability to 
lower transaction costs and take back control from powerful financial intermediaries”); The 
Trust Machine, ECONOMIST (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2015/10/31
/the-trust-machine [https://perma.cc/2EH7-K8KF] (arguing that Blockchain, “[t]he 
technology behind bitcoin[,] could transform how the economy works”); Don Tapscott, 
How Blockchains Could Change the World, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (May 2016), https://ww
w.mckinsey.com/industries/high-tech/our-insights/how-blockchains-could-change-the-world 
[https://perma.cc/AK35-F5XT] (interview statement of Don Tapscott, CEO Tapscott Group) 
(“[T]he financial-services industry is up for serious disruption—or transformation, 
depending on how it approaches [Blockchain technology].”). 
 15. See DTCC Report, supra note 14, at 9–16; INT’L ORG. SEC. COMMISSIONS, 
RESEARCH REPORT ON FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES (FINTECH) 52–58 (2017), https://www.iosc
o.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD554.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TT6-BC27] [hereinafter, 
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market participants, directly or indirectly, including all types of investors, 
although the major benefits would translate into greater profits (where 
applicable) and continued entrenchment of institutional participants such as 
stockbrokers, banks, exchanges and other trading platforms, securities 
transfer agents, and CSDs. 
The potential benefits just articulated are commendable, but this 
article takes a different approach to potential FinTech advances concerning 
securities holding infrastructures.  It emphasizes discrete risks and costs 
that are imposed on investors in securities under current intermediated 
holding systems—in particular, “intermediary” risk (including the failure or 
default by an investor’s intermediary) and the related “custody-chain” risk 
(risks imposed by holdings of securities through a chain of 
intermediaries).16  It is notable that the various explorations of DLT by 
major institutions, while emphasizing potential efficiency gains, do not 
appear to have focused on the potential for the reduction or elimination of 
intermediary risk.17  In contrast, this article articulates concrete 
modifications of the intermediated holding infrastructures that would 
reduce or eliminate these risks.  It acknowledges that DLT might provide 
improvements over current, “legacy” technologies for such a modified 
holding infrastructure.  However, the reforms proposed here do not 
necessarily depend on the application of DLT or any other particular 
technology.  Instead, they contemplate more generally that various risks 
and costs imposed by intermediated holding would be eliminated or 
reduced by eliminating or reducing intermediation in the holding of 
securities. 
The technical details of how FinTech might provide practical and 
cost-effective means to facilitate this disintermediation remain to be seen.  
This article provides a clear statement of concrete goals, targets, and results 
at which FinTech is invited to take aim—if FinTech is willing and up to the 
task.18  Indeed, a central organizing principle of the article instructs those 
with experience in the operation of financial markets and the relevant legal 
 
IOSCO Fintech Report] (detailing a myriad of benefits attributed to DLT). 
 16. See infra Part III.B. 
 17. See DTCC Report, supra note 14; IOSCO Fintech Report, supra note 15 
(demonstrating that neither report addresses the potential benefit of reducing or eliminating 
intermediary risk). 
 18. Even if FinTech could provide a feasible structure for disintermediated holding, it 
might well turn out that the “market”—i.e., the various stakeholders, including investors, 
intermediaries, other market participants, and regulators—would conclude that such reforms 
are not warranted.  But it would be a pity (although not entirely surprising) were the reforms 
to be rejected largely based on the influence of entrenched interests and the implicit 
immutability of existing systems, as opposed to such an objective cost-benefit analysis. 
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frameworks and an understanding of prevailing problems and risks to issue 
a “request for proposal” (an “RFP”)19 to the FinTech community.  It is then 
for FinTech to design and offer solutions or concede that technology is 
inadequate—at least on a cost-effective basis.  It follows that the NPS is a 
functional proposal—an RFP to eliminate intermediary risk and address 
other prevailing problems through disintermediation—not a technical one.  
I describe the NPS here in concrete terms primarily as a means for 
clarifying its functional goals and focusing the evaluation of infrastructure 
reforms. 
Following this Introduction, Part II of the article outlines current 
patterns of intermediated securities holding infrastructures.  It explains why 
post-settlement intermediated holding of securities exists and persists, as 
well as opens a window on reasons why such intermediated holding need 
not persist.  Part III then identifies and summarizes the various risks and 
costs posed by intermediated holding systems in the securities markets—
these include those that intermediated holding systems currently impose on 
investors, issuers, and other market participants.  Although the various risks 
are relatively well managed in most intermediated holding systems, this 
management imposes substantial costs that ultimately are borne by 
investors.  Part III concludes by outlining a framework for future work and 
a cost-benefit analysis of securities holding infrastructure reforms. 
Part IV summarizes and assesses some other recent proposals for 
disintermediation or increased transparency of securities market 
infrastructures, each of which pays homage in some form to the emergence 
of DLT as a potential reform agent.  Each of these proposals is useful in 
illuminating some of the prevailing problems, and exploring possible 
solutions—in particular the potential benefits of DLT in this context.  But 
Part IV concludes that, in general, these efforts are wanting for three key 
reasons: they (i) fail to acknowledge or adequately address several risks 
and costs imposed by current intermediated infrastructures, (ii) are too 
narrowly focused (in particular on shares and corporate governance), and 
(iii) do not explain how important features of existing financial markets 
could (or could not) be accommodated by their proposals. 
 
 19. See Will Kenton, Request for Proposal (RFP), INVESTOPEDIA (Sep. 12, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/request-for-proposal.asp [https://perma.cc/VL5L-VX
VC] (illustrating that the RFP is an apt metaphor in that skillfully creating a request for 
proposal may dictate the success or failure of the resulting solution.  If specified 
requirements are too vague, the bidder may not design and implement a complete solution 
for the problem.  If the requirements are too detailed and restrictive, the bidders’ creativity 
and innovation may be limited). 
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Part V is the heart of the article.  It articulates a functional, result-
oriented FinTech approach to securities holding under the NPS that would 
provide, at least for a subset of willing investors, a disintermediated 
holding system that would reduce or eliminate intermediary risk, including 
custody-chain risk, and reduce a variety of other costs and related 
problematic aspects of intermediated holding systems.  The NPS would 
directly connect investor holdings with issuers (a form of “direct” holding 
as opposed to “indirect,” intermediated holding).  The NPS would meet the 
needs that have been met in the past by intermediated holding systems, but 
without the intermediation between investors and issuers which such 
systems currently impose.  Part V explains how the NPS might be 
implemented with a minimum disruption of current practices of securities 
trading, clearance and settlement, and holding. 
Viewed from a political economy perspective, the NPS is not 
proposed as an “optimal solution” to the reduction of risk and enhanced 
efficiency in the financial markets.  It is better seen as in interim or second-
best step.  This incremental approach would enhance the likelihood that the 
NPS actually could be accepted and implemented in the global financial 
markets.  Given the influence of entrenched interests in maintaining 
intermediated holding systems, disintermediation likely would require 
regulatory intervention.  That intervention might be encouraged and 
opposition blunted by reducing the disruption to current market structures 
and practices.  By preserving current structures for trading and settlement, 
the NPS may offer the best prospect for reform in the near term.  Part V 
further explains that disintermediation of securities holding along the lines 
of the NPS could eventually eliminate the need for intermediated holding 
systems as now known.  Intermediaries would continue to play important 
roles in the securities markets after implementation of the NPS.  But for 
participating investors the NPS could eliminate intermediation (and the 
need for intermediation) in the post-settlement holding of securities. 
Having described and assessed the NPS proposal in Part V, Part VI 
then considers whether DLT might be employed in the operation of the 
NPS.  It explains how the NPS architecture could provide a “primordial 
soup” of sorts for the implementation of DLT through disintermediation 
and the connection of important market participants in ways that extend 
beyond the NPS holding structure.  The NPS could thereby provide a 
gateway for an even broader replacement of legacy securities market 
infrastructures. 
Part VII explores the prospects for the actual adoption and 
implementation of the NPS.  It examines its potential for both preservation 
and disruption of current practices, the challenges presented by persistent 
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path dependence and likely responses of entrenched financial market 
institutions and other market participants, and the potential role and 
involvement of financial market regulators.  In particular, Part VII 
considers how governments and regulators might be instrumental in the 
implementation of the NPS in the major global financial markets.  It also 
addresses important technical and practical aspects of implementation, 
including necessary modifications of law and agreements.  Part VIII 
concludes the article and summarizes its contributions. 
II. PREVAILING INTERMEDIATED HOLDING INFRASTRUCTURES: 
WHY INTERMEDIATED HOLDING? 
Intermediation plays a crucial role in the securities markets.  Others 
have thoughtfully explored this ground.20  For example, Tom Lin has 
explained the difficulties and improbability of substantial 
disintermediation.21  He argues persuasively that “[t]he core functions of 
financial intermediation will remain steadfastly unchanged because of the 
interconnected nature of finance and its human users.”22  Mary Jo White, 
then-Chair of the SEC, pointed to concerns about conflicts of interest and 
investors’ costs.  She expressed concern about “[w]hether intermediation 
has appropriately harnessed competition and technology in the service of 
investors”23 and asked: “Are the benefits being realized by investors?”24  
This article aims to answer Chair White’s question in the discrete—but 
enormously significant—context of intermediated holding of securities. 
Figure 1 illustrates a typical, although simplified, intermediated 
holding structure involving tiers of intermediaries, with each intermediary 
having its own set of account holders.25 
 
 20. See, e.g., Alessio M. Pacces, Financial Intermediation in the Securities Markets: 
Law and Economics of Conduct of Business Regulation, 20 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 479 
(2000); Tom C.W. Lin, Infinite Financial Intermediation, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643 
(2015). 
 21. Lin, supra note 20, passim. 
 22. Lin, supra note 20, at 658. 
 23. See Mary Jo White, Intermediation in the Modern Securities Markets: Putting 
Technology and Competition to Work for Investors, SEC (June 20, 2014), https://www.sec.g
ov/news/speech/2014-spch062014mjw [https://perma.cc/P3EX-CV53] (speaking about the 
current state of the securities market at the Economic Club of New York). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See GSC, supra note 2, at arts. 1(a) (defining “securities”); 1(b) (defining 
“intermediated securities”); 1(c) (defining “securities account”); 1(e) (defining “account 
holder”); 1(d) (defining “intermediary”); 1(g) (defining “relevant intermediary”) (noting that 
this article primarily uses the terminology used in the GSC in discussing intermediated 
securities holding). 




















The UNIDROIT Legislative Guide on Intermediated Securities 
(Legislative Guide),27 an important supplement to the Geneva Securities 
Convention (GSC),28 describes various legal structures adopted by States 
for intermediated holding of securities.  It identifies “direct” holding 
systems as those “in which intermediaries only serve as bookkeepers for 
investors and have no interest in investors’ securities” and “indirect” 
systems as those “in which intermediaries have an interest in investors’ 
securities.”29  A more useful explication of the direct-indirect dichotomy is 
a functional taxonomy based on which a “direct” holder, under the 
applicable law and contractual arrangements, is the legal owner of a 
security entitled to exercise directly against the issuer the rights of a 
security holder (e.g., as a shareholder or holder of a debt security) and an 
“indirect” holder (whether or not it is considered the legal owner) would 
not be so entitled. 
Notwithstanding this general, high-level direct-indirect dichotomy, the 
Legislative Guide also offers a more refined taxonomy of private-law rules 
 
 26. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 12 (drawing on Diagram 29-1 with some 
simplification and modification); ROY GOODE, HERBERT KRONKE & EWAN MCKENDRICK, 
TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW: TEXTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 427 (2d ed. 2015) 
(drawing on Figure 15.1 with some simplification and modification). 
 27. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2. 
 28. GSC, supra note 2. 
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governing the legal relationships and characteristics of these direct and 
indirect holding models.  Under the “individual ownership model” the 
ultimate account holder/investor (i.e., at the lowest tier in Figure 1) has full 
ownership of securities credited to its account.30  The “co-ownership” 
model confers co-ownership of fractional interests in securities held in a 
pool of securities held by the CSD and credited to the ultimate account 
holders/investors of an intermediary.31  Under the “trust” model, the 
participants (account holders) of the CSD are the legal owners of securities 
that the participants credit to the accounts of their investor/account holder.32  
The participant intermediaries hold the securities in trust for their 
investor/account holders, who are the trust beneficiaries and holders of 
equitable interests.  The “security entitlement” model provides that each 
account holder at every tier in the chain below the CSD obtains a security 
entitlement in the securities credited to its account.33  Under this model, an 
account holder acting in the capacity as intermediary passes on the rights 
attached to the securities to its account holders, and account holders access 
securities only through their own respective intermediaries.34  For example, 
in the United States under Article 8 (Investment Securities) of the Uniform 
Commercial Code,35 by the credit of a “security”36 or another “financial 
asset”37 by a “securities intermediary”38 to a “securities account,”39 an 
“entitlement holder”40 acquires a “security entitlement.”41 
Although the systems and the legal relationships vary greatly around 
the world, almost all have in common the power of an intermediary to 
transfer securities to some form of good faith purchaser, even without an 
account holder’s authorization, and the resulting possibility of a shortfall 
 
 30. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 17 (identifying the law of France as an 
example of this model). 
 31. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 18 (identifying the laws of Austria and 
Germany as examples of this model). 
 32. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 19 (identifying the laws of Australia, England 
and Wales, and Ireland as an examples of this model). 
 33. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 20 (identifying the laws of Canada and the 
United States as examples of this model). 
 34. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 21–22 (describing a “contractual model,” 
under which account holders acquire only contractual, as opposed to proprietary, rights to 
securities). 
 35. U.C.C. § 8 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018) [hereinafter, U.C.C.]. 
 36. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(15) (defining “security”). 
 37. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(9) (defining “financial asset”). 
 38. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(14) (defining “securities intermediary”). 
 39. U.C.C. § 8-501(a) (defining “securities account”). 
 40. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(7) (defining “entitlement holder”). 
 41. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(17) (defining “security entitlement”). 
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upon the failure of the intermediary—each an element of intermediary risk 
discussed in Part III. 
The Legislative Guide also identifies another dichotomy with respect 
to intermediated holding systems—transparent and nontransparent 
systems.42  A transparent system is one in which the “ultimate” beneficial 
owner is known and identified at the CSD level and at each other tier in the 
intermediated chain.43  But on closer examination these transparent versus 
nontransparent characterizations reflect not so much a dichotomy as a 
spectrum of relative transparency in the relationships among investors, 
intermediaries, and CSDs. 
Delphine Nougayrède’s thoughtful analysis provides clear 
descriptions and a useful taxonomy of CSD holding structures.44  At the 
nontransparent end of the spectrum are the so-called “omnibus” CSD 
accounts in which a CSD participant holds securities for its own account 
and for its account holders, including its participants’ lower-tier 
intermediaries and ultimate investors, on a commingled basis.  This is the 
dominant approach in the United States, Canada, and in the major markets 
in Europe.45  For example, in an omnibus structure in the context of Figure 
 
 42. Id. at 22–25. 
 43. See Thomas Keijser & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Intermediated Securities Holding 
Systems Revisited: A View Through the Prism of Transparency, in INTERMEDIATION AND 
BEYOND 309, 331–35 (Louise Gullifer & Jennifer Payne eds., 2019) (examining the various 
contexts in which transparency is relevant and arguing that the adoption of transparent 
information technology systems could provide substantial benefits, even without a change in 
law, and that such systems also could provide a catalyst and roadmap for law reforms 
affecting securities holding systems). 
 44. See Delphine Nougayrède, Towards a Global Financial Register?  The Case for 
End Investor Transparency in Central Securities Depositories, 4 J. FIN. REG. 276, 284–91 
(2018) (discussing Nougayrède’s description of CSD holding practices, which in turn relies 
on recent reports of the European Central Securities Depositories Association (ECSDA); 
ECSDA, ACCOUNT SEGREGATION PRACTICES AT EUROPEAN CSDS (2015), https://ecsda.eu/w
p-content/uploads/2015_10_13_ECSDA_Segregation_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/84NT-
UQNP] [hereinafter, ECSDA Segregation Report]; ECSDA, THE REGISTRATION OF 
SECURITIES HOLDERS (2016), https://ecsda.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016_07_19_ECSDA_Re
gistration_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6QC-2XKJ] [hereinafter, ECSDA Registration 
Report]. 
 45. In Europe, even omnibus systems segregate a CSD participant’s own account 
securities from client securities.  The ECSDA Segregation Report classifies 14 markets as 
omnibus markets, including France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria 
and Belgium.  Although it classifies the United Kingdom as a hybrid system by virtue of the 
availability of a form of direct holding through a “personal membership” in the CSD 
(CREST), holdings in the UK are nonetheless mostly on an omnibus basis.  See EUROCLEAR 
UK & IR., PERSONAL MEMBERSHIP (2018), www.euroclear.com/dam/Brochures/Personal-me
mbership-EUI.pdf [https://perma.cc/PP5Z-3ESD] (discussing CREST personal 
memberships); ECSDA Segregation Report, supra note 44, at 14–15; In this respect, the 
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1, above, Intermediary 3 would know and have a direct relationship with its 
account holders, including Investor 2 and Intermediary 4, but it would not 
know or have any direct relationship with Intermediary 4’s account holders, 
including Investors 3 and 4. 
Other systems involve varying levels of segregation of investor 
securities.  At the opposite end of the spectrum from omnibus accounts, 
systems embracing “end investor segregation” involve separate securities 
accounts with the CSD for each individual end investor, and the identity of 
the investor is associated with each account.46  Even with end investor 
segregation, however, the CSD does not have a direct relationship with the 
end investor, and a CSD participant manages the securities account.47  This 
dichotomy between omnibus and end investor segregation structures is both 
more descriptive and offers a more apt nomenclature than the transparent-
nontransparent appellations.  “Transparent” in this context is particularly 
misleading—the fact that an end investor’s interest is recorded at the CSD 
level does not necessarily mean that the investor’s identity is disclosed to 
any particular person, much less made available to the public generally.48 
All of these models of intermediated holding systems and their 
variations have evolved to meet the needs of financial markets and market 
participants.  In particular, the intermediated structures are designed to 
accommodate the post-trade clearing and settlement of securities 
transactions.  Clearing and settlement refer to the processes by which 
securities transactions (for example, buying and selling securities on an 
exchange) are concluded by a transfer (usually called a “delivery”) of 
securities and a corresponding payment (the delivery and payment 
constituting “settlement”).49  Clearing and settlement may be effected 
through a “central counterparty” (or “CCP”), “[a]n entity which operates as 
 
United States also might be classified as a “hybrid” system by virtue of the “Direct 
Registration System” (DRS) operated by the Depository Trust Company (the principal CSD 
in the United States.  See infra Part VII (discussing the DRS and its deficiencies). 
 46. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 288. 
 47. ECSDA Segregation report, supra note 44, at 8.  This necessarily also means that 
the issuer has no direct relationship with the end investor unless the CSD acts as the issuer’s 
registrar.  Even if the CSD acts as the registrar, the end investor generally is not empowered 
to give instructions to the issuer, such as instructions to transfer securities to another person. 
 48. See infra Part V.B.1 (discussing adaptation of the NPS to the NOBO/OBO system 
in the United States). 
 49. For an overview of the clearing and settlement processes, see DAVID LOADER, 
CLEARING, SETTLEMENT AND CUSTODY 1–16 (2d ed. 2013) (explaining a general definition 
of “clearing” as being “[t]he preparation through matching, recording and processing 
instructions of a transaction for settlement.”).  Id. at 2.  (explaining that “settlement” may be 
defined as “[t]he exchange of cash or assets in return for other assets or cash and 
transference of the ownership of those assets and cash”). 
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the buyer for every seller and as the seller for every buyer so that the 
parties only bear the credit risk of the CCP.”50 
Given the volume and velocity of modern securities markets, 
settlement could not be achieved through traditional transfer mechanisms 
such as the delivery of paper certificates or changes in registration on 
issuers’ legacy registries.  But these clearing and settlement structures have 
achieved more than the replacement of traditional means of transfer 
(delivery).  Crucially, they also accommodate the payment side as well as 
the delivery side of settlement through mechanisms for delivery versus 
payment (DVP).51  The background of the development of the national 
system for securities clearing and settlement in the United States is both 
instructive and illustrative.52 
During the 20th Century and until 1975 each exchange in the United 
States maintained a separate clearinghouse for its securities transactions.53  
The eventual centralization of securities transactions processing was 
inspired largely by settlement-related problems.  The late 1960s witnessed 
a paperwork crisis in the United States.  Settlement of trades then required 
the physical delivery of paper certificates, and transactions also involved 
numerous other paperwork requirements.  “The back offices of brokers and 
dealers were so overworked that exchanges began closing hours earlier 
than the traditional time. . . .”54  Fails to deliver and fails to receive 
securities caused enormous losses, trading volumes decreased, and many 
broker-dealers were forced to close, enter bankruptcy, or merge.55 
From this crisis a number of reforms emerged during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, including the Securities Investor Protection Act of 197056 
 
 50. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at xxii. 
 51. See Alexandra Twin, Delivery Versus Payment, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), http
s://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dvp.asp [https://perma.cc/LQ4L-NN96] (“Delivery 
versus payment (DVP) is a securities industry settlement method that . . . stipulates that the 
cash payment must be made prior to or at the same time as the delivery of the security.”). 
 52. Unless otherwise noted, the following discussing of securities clearing and 
settlement is based on WILLIAM DENTZER, THE DEPOSITORY TRUST COMPANY: DTC’S 
FORMATIVE YEARS AND CREATION OF THE DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORPORATION  
(2008); Neal L. Wolkoff & Jason B. Werner, The History of Regulation of Clearing in the 
Securities and Futures Markets, and Its Impact on Competition, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 
313 (2010); LOADER, supra note 49. 
 53. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at xxii (explaining that a clearinghouse (now 
often referred to as a “central counterparty” or “CCP”) functions to guarantee performance 
of both sides of trades). 
 54. Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 52, at 317. 
 55. Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 52, at 317–18. 
 56. Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 52, at 319. 
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and increased centralization of clearing and settlement processes.57  Most 
significant for the present discussion was the development of securities 
depositories, a development that eventually resulted in the creation of the 
Depository Trust Company (DTC) as the dominant CSD in the United 
States—a situation that persists today.58  By immobilizing securities 
certificates held in a depository such as DTC, transfers of interests in 
securities could be achieved by book entries to the accounts of its (broker-
dealer and bank) participants (such as Intermediary 2 in Figure 1) and, in 
turn, book entries by those participants to their account holders (such as 
Intermediary 3 and Investor/Account Holder 1 in Figure 1). 
For present purposes, it is important to identify precisely the work that 
intermediation is performing—it facilitates the delivery side of securities 
settlement, which also facilitates DVP mechanisms.  These observations are 
pertinent not only for the United States markets but for the global 
intermediated holding systems more generally.59  As Nougayrède has 
observed, the “complexities [of national laws dealing with intermediated 
securities] never seriously constrained the development of the markets.  
One of the reasons is that these differences in national frameworks were 
operationally ‘bridged’ by the CSDs.”60  Because intermediated securities 
are “in the system,” the intermediated infrastructure provides continual 
assurance (pre- and post-trade) that the intermediated securities will be 
available and free of obstacles to delivery (transfer) at the appropriate time 
in the applicable post-trade settlement system.61  This explains why many 
investors continue to “hold” through an intermediary after acquisition (i.e., 
post settlement).  By holding in the intermediated system, the investor 
 
 57. Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 52, at 319–24. 
 58. In 1999, DTC and National Securities Clearing Corporation (the principal clearing 
organization and CCP in the United States market) became subsidiaries of a newly formed 
holding company, The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC).  See Paolo 
Saguato, The Ownership of Clearinghouses: When Skin in the Game Is Not Enough, the 
Remutualization of Clearinghouses, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 601 (2017) (discussing a critical 
assessment of DTC); DENTZER, supra note 52, at 72. 
 59. See Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 281–84 (discussing background of development 
of CSDs and their roles in global securities markets). 
 60. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 284. 
 61. A challenge for the NPS (and any direct holding model) would be to preserve the 
flexibility of existing intermediated systems that accommodate transactional patterns of 
financing, collateralization, and securities lending.  See Joanna Benjamin & Louise Gullifer, 
Stewardship and Collateral: The Advantages and Disadvantages of the No Look Through 
System, in INTERMEDIATION AND BEYOND 215, 217–22, 233–36 (Louise Gullifer & Jennifer 
Payne eds., 2019) (explaining that intermediated holding systems promote, inter alia, 
effective risk management by securities finance market participants and proposing a 
bifurcated system for traditional investors on one hand and securities financers on the other). 
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maintains the liquidity of its investments and avoids the technical and 
logistical obstacles (including delay and expense) to the removal of 
securities from the system, connection of the investor with the issuer (such 
as by the issuance and delivery of a registered certificate and/or registration 
of the investor’s interest on the issuer’s books), and re-insertion of 
securities into the intermediated system (reversing the issuer-related 
transactions) for any subsequent disposition or other transaction.62 
This explanation and rationalization for intermediated holding begs 
the question of why such obstacles to the withdrawals and insertions of 
securities from and to the systems exist.  The answer is straightforward and 
clear: It is in the interest of the intermediaries and CSDs to keep the 
securities in the intermediated holding system, and they have no incentive 
to make ingress and egress user friendly.  This issue is considered further in 
Part VII in the context of implementation of the NPS. 
Aside from its role in facilitating the processes of trading and 
settlement described above, post-settlement intermediated holding may 
provide (or, at least, support) additional services that intermediaries provide 
to account holders.  Consider two important services that broker-dealers in 
the United States provide—extending credit to entitlement holders secured 
by securities credited to securities accounts (so-called “margin lending”) 
and securities lending. 
Broker-dealers routinely make loans to their customers (entitlement 
holders) secured by securities held in margin accounts.  Margin lending not 
only offers an important benefit for customers but also is a profitable line 
of business for broker-dealers.63  The Customer Protection Rule64 of the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) facilitates these 
transactions by permitting broker-dealers to create security interests in 
customer securities and to lend customer securities.65  The broker-dealers 
 
 62. For example, if an investor in the United States wishes to have a paper certificate 
issued and registered in its name, a nontrivial delay would occur before a certificate is 
issued and received by the investor.  In order to sell the securities, the investor would have 
to endorse the certificate and have its signature guaranteed so that the securities can be put 
back into the intermediated system.  This process takes time and imposes expenses on the 
investor.  See Holding Your Securities Get the Facts, SEC (Mar. 4, 2003), https://www.sec.g
ov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsholdsechtm.html [https://perma.cc/9FG9-
B7LW]; FAQS: How Issuers Work with DTC, DTCC, http://www.dtcc.com/settlement-and-
asset-services/issuer-services/how-issuers-work-with-dtc [https://perma.cc/RRL6-KGML]. 
 63. Paul Meyer, Securities-Based Lending, SEC. LITIG. & CONSULTING GROUP, https://w
ww.slcg.com/pdf/workingpapers/securities-based-lending.pdf [https://perma.cc/BBN9-E4F 
7] (last visited Nov. 16, 2019) (“Substantial profit margins in the lending business make 
SBLs [securities-based loans] a lucrative product for broker-dealers.”). 
 64. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (2019). 
 65. See infra Part V.B.7 (discussing the Customer Protection Rule and NPS 
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may fund loans to customers with their own borrowings secured, in turn, by 
these customer securities.  More frequently broker-dealers obtain funding 
by lending customer securities, with the securities borrowers’ obligations to 
return like securities being secured by cash collateral.66 
The intermediated holding system in the United States also facilitates 
the treatment of fails to deliver securities in the settlement system.  Under 
the “continuous net settlement” system, fails to deliver securities at 
settlement are routinely carried over and netted for settlement on the 
following day.67  However, customer accounts normally would be credited 
for securities even though they have not yet been received.68 
While much of this flexibility for margin lending, securities lending, 
and fails could be preserved under the NPS,69 some other proposals for 
direct holding fail even to recognize or address these considerations.70  A 
challenge for the NPS and any direct-holding system will be to 
 
accommodations). 
 66. “In a securities lending transaction the lender transfers outright ownership of 
securities to the borrower and the borrower agrees to redeliver like securities to the lender at 
an agreed time in the future.”  Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Truth About Shortfall of 
Intermediated Securities: Perspectives Under the Geneva Securities Convention, United 
States Law, and the Future European Legislation, in INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES: THE 
IMPACT OF THE GENEVA SECURITIES CONVENTION AND THE FUTURE EUROPEAN LEGISLATION 
160, 170 n.43 (Pierre-Henri Conac, Ulrich Segna & Luc Thévenoz eds., 2013).  Borrowers 
of securities typically do so in order to deliver the securities under a short sale.  Id. at 174.  
The seller in a short sale “hopes to acquire the same securities at a lower price in the future 
in order to return them to the [securities] lender.”  Id. at 174 n.64. 
 67. Alistair Milne, Central Securities Depositories and Securities Clearing and 
Settlement: Business Practice and Public Policy Concerns, in ANALYZING THE ECONOMICS 
OF FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES 344 (Martin Diehl et al. eds., 2016); see also 
Equity, Corporate and Muni Debt Transaction Processing, DTCC, http://www.dtcc.com/set
tlement-and-asset-services/settlement/equity-corporate-debt [https://perma.cc/7DJW-BABF] 
(describing the DTC’s settlement service). 
 68. See Division of Market Regulation: Responses to Frequently Asked Questions 
Concerning Regulation SHO, Answer to Question 7.1, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/
marketreg/mrfaqregsho1204.htm [https://perma.cc/7WC8-KH24] (last visited Jan. 26, 2020) 
(emphasis added): “There is significant confusion relating to the fact that the aggregate 
number of positions reflected in customer accounts at broker-dealers may in fact be greater 
than the number of securities issued and outstanding.  This is due in part to the fact that 
securities intermediaries, such as broker-dealers and banks, credit customer accounts prior 
to delivery of the securities.  For most securities trading in the U.S. market, delivery 
subsequently occurs as expected.  However, fails to deliver can occur for a variety of 
legitimate reasons, and flexibility is necessary in order to ensure an orderly market and to 
facilitate liquidity.” 
 69. See infra Part V.B.7 (discussing NPS accommodation of margin lending, securities 
lending, and fails to deliver/receive).  This would especially be so if and while the option of 
holding through the legacy intermediated holding system remained available. 
 70. See infra Part IV (discussing various proposals for disintermediation). 
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accommodate sufficient flexibility for preservation of valuable 
transactional patterns and to meet political opposition based on perceived 
threats to established market practices. 
III. RISKS AND COSTS IMPOSED BY INTERMEDIATION 
Intermediaries play vital roles in securities markets.  For example, 
brokers accommodate trading on exchanges and other trading platforms.  
Brokers and other intermediaries are essential actors in modern systems for 
clearing and settlement of securities trades.  Bank custodians provide many 
services to institutional investors, including reliable recordkeeping.  These 
are essential and beneficial functions.  But this Part identifies and describes 
a variety of risks and costs imposed by intermediation in the securities 
markets.  It puts in context a principal focus of this article—the risks and 
costs imposed by post-settlement holding through intermediaries and the 
attendant methods and costs of addressing these risks.  It sets the stage for 
consideration and assessment of the development of the NPS proposal—a 
market infrastructure that would, post-settlement, eliminate or reduce these 
post-settlement risks and costs by allowing investors to connect directly 
with issuers instead of holding through accounts with intermediaries.  
A. Settlement-Related Risks 
This article focuses primarily on post-settlement intermediated 
holding and related risks and costs—in particular, post-settlement 
intermediary risk discussed next in subpart B.  However, post-settlement 
holding persists largely in order to facilitate settlement and thereby to 
ensure liquidity.71  For this reason, it is useful to consider systems for 
settlement and settlement-related risks before turning attention to post-
settlement holding intermediary risk. 
An important 1988 report by the Group of Thirty72 (G30 Report) 
profoundly influenced modern systems for clearance and settlement in the 
 
 71. See supra Part II. 
 72. GROUP OF THIRTY (G30), CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD’S 
SECURITIES MARKETS (1988), https://group30.org/images/uploads/publications/G30_Clearan
ceSettlement1988.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA6L-GVJV] [hereinafter G30 Report].  Significant 
later studies include reports by the International Securities Services Association (ISSA) and 
follow-up work by the G30.  See ISSA, RECOMMENDATIONS 2000 (2000); GROUP OF THIRTY 
(30), GLOBAL CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT: FINAL MONITORING REPORT (2006), https://group
30.org/images/uploads/publications/G30_GlobalClearingSettlementFinalMonitoringReport.
pdf [https://perma.cc/EHC8-TQVL].  For general background, see LOADER, supra note 49, 
at 5–11. 
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world’s securities markets.73  The G30 Report proposed “standards for 
clearance and settlement which should be set and maintained by national 
corporate securities markets to maximize efficiency and reduce risk and 
cost.”74  Modern settlement systems are structured to manage these risks. 
“Principal risk” in the settlement of securities transactions is the risk 
that payment might be made but the delivery of a security would not be 
forthcoming or, conversely, that delivery might be made but payment 
would not occur.75  Principal risk is managed primarily by DVP systems 
that essentially provide for simultaneous payment and delivery.76  But DVP 
does not solve the problem of trade failures (or “fails”) in which DVP does 
not occur because of the failure of a counterparty either to pay or deliver.  
If a delivery does not occur (such as because of a counterparty’s 
insolvency) then costs and losses may arise from having to replace a failed 
trade with a new trade—”replacement risk.”77  In many cases delivery may 
be delayed, even if it eventually occurs, but meanwhile buyers and sellers 
that are expecting deliveries and payment are exposed to “liquidity risk.”78  
These replacement and liquidity risks generally are addressed in clearance 
and settlement systems through the interposition of a CCP,79 which serves 
to ensure that settlement will occur regardless of a default by a participant 
in the system.80  The role of the CCP and multilateral netting of trades 
among system participants results in a great reduction in the number of 
trades that must be settled.81  Liquidity risk and replacement risk are also 
addressed by institutional frameworks for borrowing and lending securities 
and “repurchase” (or “repo”) transactions.82 
Additional safeguards backstop the performance of payment and 
delivery obligations in settlement systems.83  Settlement risks also have 
 
 73. See DENTZER, supra note 52, at 55–57 (discussing influence of G30 Report on 
DTC’s system); LOADER, supra note 49, at 5–7 (discussing influence of G30 Report on 
clearing and settlement systems). 
 74. G30 Report, supra note 72, at 1. 
 75. Milne, supra note 67, at 340–42. 
 76. Id.; see supra Part II (discussing DVP). 
 77. Milne, supra note 67, at 342–44.  For example, a buyer is exposed to replacement 
cost risk if the market price of securities that are not delivered is higher than the contract 
price. 
 78. Id. at 342.  For example, a seller that does not receive payment may need to borrow 
funds or sell assets to meet its own payment obligations.  Id. at 342–44. 
 79. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at xxii (explaining that clearinghouses, or 
CCPs, function to guarantee performance of both sides of trades). 
 80. Milne, supra note 67, at 342–44. 
 81. Milne, supra note 67, at 343. 
 82. Milne, supra note 67, at 344–46. 
 83. See, e.g., DEPOSITORY TR. CO., DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK FOR COVERED CLEARING 
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been reduced substantially by shortening the periods between the time that 
a trade is made (trade date) and the time of settlement (settlement date).84  
Rules that ensure the finality of settlement payments and deliveries of 
securities further reduce risk.85  Finally, these settlement-related risks also 
potentially harbor “systemic risk,”86 which is ameliorated by the reduction 
of settlement risks generally. 
The risks inherent in the settlement of securities transactions have 
been managed well by settlement systems in major markets.  Indeed, one of 
the harshest critics of the United States infrastructure for securities trading, 
settlement, and holding has observed that the current system “enjoys 
universal respect,” “is fast, secure, and profitable,” and “cheap.”87  But the 
risks imposed on an investor by an intermediary’s default or failure do not 
vanish at settlement.  Subpart B next addresses the post-settlement 
intermediary risks that persist when an investor continues to hold securities 
through an account with an intermediary. 
 
AGENCIES AND FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES 11 (2018), www.dtcc.com/~/media/F
iles/Downloads/legal/.../DTC_Disclosure_Framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/XA2F-8QVM] 
[hereinafter DTC Framework] (explaining that “DTC may pledge or liquidate collateral of 
the defaulting Participant in order to complete settlement.  Liquidity resources, including the 
Participants Fund and a committed line of credit with a consortium of lenders, are available 
to complete settlement if there is a Participant default.”). 
 84. At the time of the 1988 G30 Report the norm for settlement in the United States and 
in many other markets was the fifth business day following the trade date (T+5), and the 
report’s Recommendation 7 called for settlement to occur by T+3 no later than 1992.  G30 
Report, supra note 72, at 14.  The standard settlement date in the United States markets 
moved to T+2 in 2017.  Amendment to Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle - A Small 
Entity Compliance Guide, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/tm/t2-sbrefa [https://perma.cc/C4BY-2
X5Y]. 
 85. DTC Framework, supra note 83, at 19–20 (discussing settlement finality). 
 86. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SECURITIES SETTLEMENT 
SYSTEMS 39 (2001) (“If the failure of one participant renders other participants unable to 
meet their obligations, the settlement system might be a source of instability for financial 
markets more generally (systemic risk).”); Milne, supra note 67, at 349 (noting that extreme 
complexity of modern clearing and settlement systems “is itself a potential source of 
systemic problems”). 
 87. David C. Donald & Mahdi H. Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings and Unified Pricing 
to Securities Markets with Distributed Ledger Technology 3, 37 (Mar. 14, 2019) 
[hereinafter Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings] (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author).  David C. Donald & Mahdi H. Miraz, Multilateral Transparency for Securities 
Markets Through DLT (Chinese Univ. of H.K. Faculty of Law, Research Paper No. 2019-
05, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3352293 [https://perma.cc/Z3SB-UM84]; see also 
David C. Donald, Heart of Darkness: The Problem at the Core of the US Proxy System and 
Its Solution, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 41 passim (2011). 
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B. Post-Settlement (Holding) Intermediary Risk 
1. Default or Failure of Relevant Intermediary 
The post-settlement intermediated holding phenomenon results from 
demands for convenience and liquidity afforded by leaving securities “in 
the system” and the prevailing costs, delay, and inconvenience of 
withdrawals and reinsertions of securities into and out of intermediated 
holding systems.88  But holding through an intermediary imposes another 
set of risks on an account holder consisting of the possibility of loss or 
damage caused by the default or insolvency of an account holder’s 
intermediary.  As I have explained elsewhere: “Intermediary risk is a 
function of the structure of a particular holding system, including the 
holding infrastructure and its relevant technology, the relevant private law 
of property and contract, legal and contractual duties that underpin the 
holding structure, the regulatory framework, and the relevant insolvency 
laws.”89 
First, consider these risks in terms of the rights to which an account 
holder is entitled and the related obligations of its relevant intermediary.90  
GSC Article 9 provides for the rights conferred on an account holder91 and 
Article 10 sets forth the corresponding obligations that a relevant 
intermediary owes to its account holders.92  Although the GSC’s functional 
approach leaves niceties of legal doctrine to the non-Convention law,93 and 
the actual rights and obligations under a given State’s laws may differ, 
these GSC provisions provide a useful framework for the present analysis. 
Under GSC Article 9, an account holder is entitled to the rights 
attached to securities, such as distributions of dividends and voting rights, 
the right to dispose of or transfer interests in securities, the right to hold 
securities other than through a securities account (if otherwise permitted), 
 
 88. See supra Part II. 
 89. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Global Standards for Securities Holding Infrastructures: A 
Soft Law/Fintech Model for Reform, 40 MICH. J. INT’L L. 531, 532 (2019). 
 90. See GSC, supra note 2, art. 1(g) (defining “relevant intermediary” as “in relation to 
a securities account, the intermediary that maintains that securities account for the account 
holder.”). 
 91. GSC, supra note 2, art. 9. 
 92. GSC, supra note 2, art. 10. 
 93. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 35 (discussing GSC’s functional approach 
that leaves significant legal and regulatory issues to the law outside of the GSC).  The GSC 
defines “non-Convention law” as “the law in force in [a] . . . Contracting State . . . , other 
than the provisions of” the GSC.  GSC, supra note 2, art. 1(m). 
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and other rights under the non-Convention law.94  Article 10 provides that 
the relevant intermediary must take steps to allow its account holders to 
enjoy these Article 9 rights and also must comply with other obligations 
imposed by the GSC.95  These obligations of the relevant intermediary 
include maintaining sufficient amounts of securities to reflect its credits to 
securities accounts,96 allocating securities to its account holders so as to be 
unavailable to the intermediary’s creditors,97 acting on instructions of its 
account holders,98 not making unauthorized dispositions of securities,99 and 
passing on information to its account holders.100 
Inasmuch as securities intermediaries such as stockbrokers and banks 
normally are regulated institutions, as a practical matter, the wrongful 
failure of a viable and solvent intermediary to meet its obligations to 
account holders generally is not a problem.101  But when an intermediary 
becomes financially distressed, which typically involves the 
commencement of an insolvency proceeding, the rights of account holders 
may be jeopardized.  This generally entails two sets of risks.  One risk is 
that the securities necessary to satisfy account holder rights and claims will 
not be available (i.e., a shortfall).  The other risk is that the account holders 
will not have prompt and effective access to the securities. 
Regulatory regimes, private law, and insolvency law address the rights 
of and protections for account holders in this setting.  For example, 
intermediaries sometimes are required to “segregate” or set aside account 
holder securities as a mechanism to enhance the prospect that sufficient 
securities will be on hand to satisfy account holder claims.102  Moreover, 
both private law rules and insolvency distributional rules address the 
protection and priority of account holder claims to securities as against the 
claims of an intermediary’s unsecured creditors.  In general, securities 
 
 94. GSC, supra note 2, art. 9(1). 
 95. GSC, supra note 2, art. 10(1), (2). 
 96. GSC, supra note 2, arts. 10(2)(a), 24. 
 97. GSC, supra note 2, arts. 10(2)(b), 25.  
 98. GSC, supra note 2, art. 10(2)(c).  
 99. GSC, supra note 2, arts. 10(2)(d), 15.  
 100. GSC, supra note 2, art. 10(2)(e). 
 101. See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and 
Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 305, 
363–64 (1990) (“Because the actual enforcement of property interests against financial 
institution intermediaries outside of insolvency proceedings is unlikely, it is the entitlement 
in those proceedings that is material.”). 
 102. Id. at art. 25; LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 81–84 (discussing and 
diagramming methods of segregating accounts and highlighting, inter alia, the importance 
of account segregation and other such mechanisms to ensure account integrity and the 
avoidance of shortfalls). 
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allocated by an intermediary to its account holders are not available for 
satisfaction of the intermediary’s general creditors.103  In many systems, 
certain classes of account holders are protected by funds or insurance 
schemes, generally up to a specified maximum amount.104  While such 
protective schemes may provide ample protection for smaller, “retail” 
investors, they generally do not afford protection to the larger, active 
“institutional” investors.  However, these schemes nonetheless provide 
clear evidence that the intermediary risks considered here are real and 
significant. 
Intermediary risk in securities holding also lies at the core of the 
private-law regime for intermediated securities in the United States, as 
reflected in UCC Article 8 and the regulations governing United States 
government securities.  As I explained in an article proposing a new 
approach for UCC Article 8, “[i]t appears that the single, most powerful, 
control that a market participant can employ to reduce intermediary risk is 
to exercise precaution by selecting an intermediary that will not fail.”105 
The significance of intermediary risk in securities holding systems is 
reflected as well by other features of intermediated securities holding 
infrastructures and the relevant regulatory environment.  Consider two 
relatively recent reports issued by the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) on the protection of client assets 
(“Client Asset Reports”).106  The 2014 IOSCO Report adopted several 
 
 103. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 82. 
 104. For example, the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) protects eligible non-
institutional account holders of insolvent registered broker-dealers against losses up to 
$500,000.  15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3(a) (2018). 
 105. Mooney, supra note 101, at 388; see Francis J. Facciolo, Father Knows Best: 
Revised Article 8 and the Individual Investor, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 615, 635 (2000) 
(“Professor Charles W. Mooney, Jr., the legal academic whose ideas form the intellectual 
underpinnings of Revised [Uniform Commercial Code] Article 8 . . . .”) (footnote omitted); 
id. at 664 (“Professor Mooney proposed the model of ‘upper-tier priority,’ which became 
the intellectual foundation of Revised Article 8 . . . .”) (footnote omitted).  The federal 
regulations for book-entry government securities as finally adopted embraced the substance 
of revised Article 8.  Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Roles of Individuals in UCC Reform: Is 
the Uniform Law Process a Potted Plant? The Case of Revised UCC Article 8, 27 OKLA. 
CITY U. L. REV. 553, 572–73 (2002) [hereinafter Mooney, Individuals].  See also Steven L. 
Schwarcz & Joanna Benjamin, Intermediary Risk in the Indirect Holding System for 
Securities, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 309 (2002). 
 106. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS (“IOSCO”), RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE 
PROTECTION OF CLIENT ASSETS (2014), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCO
PD436.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5BL-Z2V5] [hereinafter 2014 IOSCO Report]; IOSCO, 
THEMATIC REVIEW OF THE ADOPTION OF THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN IOSCO’S REPORT: 
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF CLIENT ASSETS (2017), https://www.ios
co.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD577.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3ZN-3GVH] [hereinafter 
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principles relating to the responsibilities of an intermediary to its clients 
(account holders) and to appropriate protections for assets held in securities 
accounts.107  The principles embrace standards concerning matters such as 
record keeping, account statements, safeguarding clients’ rights and 
minimizing risks of loss and misuse of assets, understanding and dealing 
with assets in foreign jurisdictions, clear disclosures of protections regimes 
and risks involved, arrangements relating to client waivers of protections, 
regulatory oversight of intermediary compliance, and regulatory oversight 
of domestic rules concerning foreign assets.108  The principles reflect the 
vital roles played by intermediaries and related regulatory regimes.  They 
establish conduct and results that intermediaries, regulators, and custodial 
arrangements “should” observe and achieve.109  Even so, shortfalls of 
account holder securities in intermediary insolvencies may be expected.110 
The insolvency proceeding of an account holder’s relevant 
intermediary provides the “acid test” of its intermediated securities 
holdings.  The laws of many jurisdictions have specialized rules relating to 
insolvency proceedings of securities intermediaries.111  Although this is a 
complex and arcane area, it is important to note that an intermediary’s 
insolvency proceeding may expose an account holder to substantial risk, 
cost and delay.  Moreover, this may be the case even if the account holder’s 
rights are clear and undisputed under the applicable private, noninsolvency 
law and even if those rights are generally respected in the insolvency 
proceeding.  For example, account holders experienced substantial delays 
in recovering their securities holdings in the administration of Lehman 
Brothers International (Europe) (LBIE) under English law.112  The relevant 
English insolvency law and procedures simply were not up to the task.113 
This LBIE experience underscores an important distinction between 
an investor holding through a transparent intermediated system and an 
 
2017 IOSCO Report].  References to the “client” in this context refer to an investor/account 
holder holding through an intermediated holding system.  For a discussion of the Client 
Asset Reports, see Mooney, supra note 89, at 537–39. 
 107. 2014 IOSCO Report, supra note 106, at 3–9. 
 108. 2014 IOSCO Report, supra note 106, at 3–9. 
 109. 2014 IOSCO Report, supra note 106, at 3–9.  
 110. See Mooney, supra note 66. 
 111. See, e.g., supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing protective schemes for 
certain investors in case of intermediary insolvency proceedings); see generally 
LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 96–103 (discussing insolvency law relevant to 
intermediated securities). 
 112. Charles W. Mooney, Jr. & Guy Morton, Harmonizing Insolvency Law for 
Intermediated Securities: The Way Forward, in TRANSNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW 217–24 
(Thomas Keijser ed., 2013). 
 113. Id. at 219–21 (describing problems encountered in returning client assets). 
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investor holding directly on an issuer’s register.  Even if the investor’s 
interest held in a transparent system is clear, undisputed, and generally 
effective in its intermediary’s insolvency proceeding, the investor may be 
exposed to serious costs and delays in recovering its securities if the 
insolvency regime is not sufficiently nimble.  But an investor holding 
directly with the issuer would normally be in a position to transfer and 
enjoy the benefits of the securities unhindered by any intermediary’s 
insolvency proceeding. 
That the losses incurred by account holders in actual insolvency 
proceedings of intermediaries may not be significant does not diminish the 
centrality and significance of intermediary risk in assessing intermediated 
holding systems.  Even if the various prophylactic measures114 and 
protection schemes115 addressing IM risk have generally been effective, 
those measures impose costs that disintermediation could reduce or 
eliminate.  And these costs may exceed the benefits of maintaining the 
current systems.  That actual losses and damages as a result of actual 
intermediary defaults and insolvencies may have been managed well is not 
necessarily a sufficient justification for the costs of the maintaining the 
status quo.116 
2. Custody-Chain Risk: Failure, Default, or Nonliability of 
Intermediary in Holding Chain 
The foregoing discussion in subpart III.B.1. addressed intermediary 
risk in the context of the default or failure of an account holder’s relevant 
intermediary.  When an account holder holds securities through a chain of 
intermediaries, however, these risks are exacerbated.  In this context, the 
account holder’s intermediary (custodian) is said to hold through one or 
more “sub-custodians” holding between the account holder and the issuer 
of the securities.  As noted in ISSA’s recent study of custody-chain risks: 
A sub-custodian provides custody services with respect to 
securities traded in a particular market or jurisdiction, on behalf 
 
 114. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing IOSCO Reports and principles for protection of 
client assets). 
 115. See supra text at note 104 (outlining protective schemes for certain investors in case 
of intermediary insolvency proceedings). 
 116. So long as legacy intermediated holding systems would be maintained as an 
investor alternative to the NPS, at least some of these costs would remain.  But, to the extent 
that legacy intermediated holdings were materially reduced, the costs also might be reduced 
proportionately.  For example, if most retail investors opted for holding through the NPS, 
the costs of maintaining investor protection schemes could be reduced or eventually 
eliminated. 
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of a global custodian who may not have an operation in that 
jurisdiction.  A sub-custodian may also be referred to as an 
‘agent bank’, and its relationship with the global custodian will 
be governed by a ‘sub-custody agreement’.  In some instances, 
the sub-custodian will be part of the same parent group of the 
global custodian.117 
Eva Micheler has clearly and thoroughly described and analyzed these 
custody-chain risks.118  Micheler’s argument, powerfully advanced, is 
straightforward: 
Custody chains do more than transform direct into indirect rights.  
They modify rights.  Custody chains reduce investor rights to the 
least favourable custody term operating in the chain. . . . 
[C]ompared to a directly held asset an indirectly held asset can be 
significantly reduced in value.  Custody chains make it next to 
impossible for investors to claim against issuers . . . .  They can 
cause securities to become affected by security interests of sub-
custodians . . . and securities financing transactions . . . .  
Equitable interests are compromised by shortfalls caused by 
negligence or fraud. . . .  Custody chains also significantly reduce 
the accountability of custodians. . . .119 
She demonstrates that an investor’s rights are not only affected by a 
contract with his immediate intermediary, but by all of the other contracts 
among the various sub-custodians in the holding chain.120  In effect, an 
investor’s rights “revert to the lowest denominator.  Any term in a custody 
chain that qualifies or limits the rights of a sub-custodian also reduces the 
rights of the investor.”121  These custody chains occur not only domestically 
but, significantly, across international borders.122 
Custody chains, then, impose risks of the failure or default not only of 
an account holder’s relevant intermediary but also that of other 
intermediaries in the holding chain with which the account holder has no 
direct relationship.  Because of the absence of such a direct relationship, 
the account holder normally will have no claim whatsoever against those 
 
 117. ISSA, INHERENT RISKS WITHIN THE GLOBAL CUSTODY CHAIN 14 (2017), https://ww
w.issanet.org/e/pdf/ISSA_Report_Inherent_Risk_February-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5KY6-GQRH]. 
 118. Eva Micheler, Custody Chains and Asset Values: Why Crypto-Securities Are Worth 
Considering, 74 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 505 (2015). 
 119. Id. at 5. 
 120. Id. at 7. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 2. 
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other intermediaries.123  Custody chains also aggravate the already 
substantial obstacles to an account holder’s exercise of rights against an 
issuer,124 considered next. 
C. Exercise of Investor Rights (Voting, Corporate Actions, Claims 
Against Issuers, Etc.) 
Problems created by intermediated holding systems for the exercise 
and enjoyment of investor rights vis-à-vis issuers are well known and have 
garnered the lion’s share of relevant commentary.125  This is unsurprising 
inasmuch as investments in securities are in the wheelhouse of scholars of 
corporate and securities regulation law.  Moreover, the foundational 
circumstance that account holders holding through intermediaries do not 
hold on the books of issuers makes this set of problems quite visible.  The 
extensive treatment elsewhere justifies the relatively brief treatment here, 
notwithstanding the enormous significance of these issues.  As with 
investor rights in an intermediary’s insolvency proceeding,126 differences 
between an investor holding directly on the books of an issuer’s register 
and holding in an intermediated system—even if the system is transparent 
and efficient—are significant. 
The seminal study of corporate voting in the United States by Marcel 
Kahan and Edward Rock is exemplary.  They examined “pathologies of 
complexity,”127 “of ownership,”128 and “of misalignment between voting 
 
 123. Id. at 8. 
 124. Id. at 14–19. 
 125. See, e.g., Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 298–99; Donald, supra note 87; Marcel 
Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEORGETOWN L.J. 
1227 (2008); Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail 
Investor, 102 MINN. L. REV. 11 (2017); George S. Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate 
Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 227 (2018); Eva Micheler, Transfer of Intermediated Securities 
and Legal Certainty, in TRANSNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW, supra note 112, at 119–23; Paul 
Davies, Investment Chains and Corporate Governance, in INTERMEDIATION AND BEYOND 
187–214 (Louise Gullifer & Jennifer Payne eds., 2019).  See also infra Part IV (discussing 
recent proposals for disintermediation and problems associated with intermediated holding). 
 126. See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text (discussing the risks that account 
holders bear in an intermediary’s insolvency proceeding). 
 127. Kahan & Rock, supra note 125, at 1249–55.  Earlier studies focused on voting and 
other problems in the United Kingdom.  See generally OXERA, CORPORATE ACTION 
PROCESSING: WHAT ARE THE RISKS? (2004), https://www.oxera.com/publications/corporate-
action-processing-what-are-the-risks/ [https://perma.cc/N9MF-WVNM]; PAUL MYNERS, 
REVIEW OF THE IMPEDIMENTS TO VOTING UK SHARES (2004).  Analogous problems exist 
outside of corporate shareholder voting as well.  See, e.g., Jennifer Payne, Intermediation 
and Bondholder Schemes of Arrangement, in INTERMEDIATION AND BEYOND 173–86 (Louise 
Gullifer & Jennifer Payne eds., 2019) (discussing voting of bondholders under English law 
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rights and economic interest.”129  Their assessment offered severe criticism: 
“[t]he existing system of shareholder voting is crude, imprecise, and 
fragile.”130  They concluded that “marginal ameliorations are clearly 
possible” but that resolving the serious problems with voting would 
“require[] a realignment of our system of securities ownership, a change 
that is expensive and uncertain, both practically and politically.”131 
Aside from voting, suffice it to note that problems created by 
intermediated holding systems extend to “corporate actions”132 more 
generally.133  In particular, intermediated holding has presented obstacles 
for investors seeking to assert claims against issuers.134 
D. Costs of Nontransparency 
The intermediary risks and investor rights addressed in subparts III.B. 
and C. primarily involve adverse consequences for investors and 
impairments of investors’ legal entitlements resulting from intermediated 
holding systems.  As noted, these problems would be reduced or eliminated 
by direct holding.  This subpart identifies a different set of problems that 
arise from the nontransparency of deeply intermediated holding systems.  
These costs of nontransparency arise in a several contexts.  The problems 
might well be adequately addressed by adopting transparent intermediated 
holding systems, even without the implementation of direct holding.  
However, a direct holding regime such as the NPS might prove to be the 
most effective and efficient means of providing needed transparency (while 
 
schemes of arrangement). 
 128. Kahan & Rock, supra note 125, at 1255–63. 
 129. Kahan & Rock, supra note 125, at 1263–67. 
 130. Kahan & Rock, supra note 125, at 1279. 
 131. Kahan & Rock, supra note 125, at 1281. 
 132. As Donald explained, “corporate actions . . . is a term used by the settlement 
industry to designate all actions requiring communication between issuers and shareholders, 
such as rights issues, tender offers, conversions, mergers, early redemptions and dividend 
payments.”  Donald, supra note 87, at 73–74. 
 133. See id. passim. 
 134. See, e.g., Geis, supra note 125, at 238–48, 270–72 (discussing shareholder suits 
under state and federal law in the United States); see also Louise Gullifer, Two 
Consequences of the Intermediated Holding of Debt Securities: Examining Discharge of 
Debt and Set-off, in INTERMEDIATION AND BEYOND 155–74 (Louise Gullifer & Jennifer 
Payne eds., 2019) (discussing discharge and set-off involving intermediated debt securities 
under English law); see also Micheler, supra note 125, at 119–23 (discussing enforcement 
of intermediated debt securities under English law); Richard Salter, Enforcing Debt 
Securities, in INTERMEDIATION AND BEYOND 129–54 (Louise Gullifer & Jennifer Payne eds., 
2019) (discussing enforcement of intermediated debt securities under English law). 
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providing other benefits as well).135 
1. Anti-Money Laundering, Sanctions Compliance, Terrorist 
Financing, Taxation 
Nontransparency frustrates the needs of various regulators to obtain 
information about investor holdings in order to protect and promote a 
variety of public interests that are unrelated to investor rights.  For 
example, Nougayrède has called attention to concerns about anti-money 
laundering (AML), sanctions compliance, and terrorist financing.  She 
notes: 
A push for beneficial ownership transparency in all forms of 
legal entities is taking place around the world in the field of . . . 
AML.  Economic sanctions are increasingly used as non-violent 
alternatives to traditional military action in foreign relations, 
especially by the US and EU: to be effective, these tools require 
transparency in custodial chains and regulators have begun to cut 
through these. . . .136 
The need for increased transparency also has prompted various reform 
efforts in connection with taxation and tax evasion.137  All of these areas 
would benefit from increased transparency in intermediated holding 
systems (or the adoption of direct-holding regimes such as the NPS). 
 
 135. For investors that do not opt in to direct registration under the NPS, the centralized 
data collection mechanism required for the NPS necessarily would produce data that would 
provide transparency in the intermediated holding system.  Even if that data were not 
utilized for direct registration under the NPS, it would be available and accessible for other 
permitted purposes.  However, increased transparency and the loss of anonymity also pose 
risks in the form of threats to privacy, confidentiality, and data protection.  Panisi, Buckley, 
and Arner have wisely advised to “strike a balance” between the privacy concerns and the 
benefits of enhanced transparency.  Federico Panisi, Ross P. Buckley & Douglas Arner 
(PB&A), Blockchain and Public Companies: A Revolution in Share Ownership 
Transparency, Proxy-voting and Corporate Governance?, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & 
POL’Y 1, 15 (2019). 
 136. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 278–79; see also id. at 301–05 (discussing 
Clearstream Banking S.A. (Luxembourg) and United States settlement relating to Central 
Bank of Iran assets blocked under United States sanctions legislation and debates within the 
securities industry on related transparency issues); Keijser & Mooney, supra note 43, at 
326–30 (discussing problems of intermediated holding systems in the contexts of AML, 
terrorist financing and other criminal activity, and foreign investments in strategic 
enterprises). 
 137. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 306–08. 
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2. Upper-Tier Attachment Prohibitions 
Somewhat analogous to AML concerns, nontransparent intermediated 
holding systems may afford an investor the means of hiding or shielding its 
securities from the reach of creditors.  For example, UCC section 8-112 
provides that a debtor’s interest in a security entitlement may be reached by 
a creditor only through legal process on the debtor-entitlement holder’s 
relevant intermediary.138  The GSC contains a similar prohibition on 
“upper-tier attachment.”139  The Legislative Guide identifies the basis for 
these restrictions: 
[U]pper-tier intermediaries usually do not know and are unable to 
specify what part of the securities or intermediated securities are 
the relevant securities that should be subject to the attachment.  
Even if upper-tier intermediaries can identify the relevant 
securities or intermediated securities, permitting upper-tier 
attachment could produce enormous costs for the relevant upper-
tier intermediary in identifying the relevant securities or 
intermediated securities and could prevent efficient operations of 
the intermediated securities holding system.140 
A transparent or direct holding system would eliminate the need for 
such a prohibition.141 
E. Private-Law Rules 
The private-law rules governing intermediated holding systems vary 
enormously.142  Indeed, the Legislative Guide was inspired by the reality 
that only limited harmonization could be realized in the text of the GSC.143  
The reality also is that the GSC is not yet in force after more than a decade 
and in general harmonization efforts have not been successful.  So long as 
 
 138. U.C.C. § 8-112(c) (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1992). 
 139. GSC, supra note 2, art. 22(1) (prohibiting upper-tier attachment). 
 140. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 78. 
 141. The GSC creates an exception to the prohibition if a contracting state has made a 
qualifying declaration to the effect that it has procedures that eliminate the information 
problems addressed by the prohibition—primarily intended for States with transparent 
holding systems.  GSC, supra note 2, art. 22(3); see LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 
79–80; see also Keijser & Mooney, supra note 43, at 317–19.  UCC section 8-112 makes no 
such exception. 
 142. See supra Part III.E (discussing a variety and taxonomy of private-law rules). 
 143. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that the GSC “leaves various issues 
to be defined and determined by other rules of law in force in a Contracting State” and 
“complements the [GSC] by addressing these issues”). 
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intermediated holding systems exist, of course, these private-law regimes 
will be necessary—lack of harmonization notwithstanding.  But widespread 
adoption of direct-holding systems such as the NPS would reduce the role 
and significance of these rules and the inefficiencies and uncertainties 
spawned by their proliferation and nonuniformity. 
F. Concluding Observations: A Framework for Cost-Benefit Analysis 
and Future Work 
This Part has shown that intermediated holding systems, and in 
particular the deeply intermediated, omnibus account systems in the United 
States and major European markets, create a host of risks and costs and are 
problematic in a variety of circumstances.  It has identified the principal 
risks and costs and explained that direct holding and increased transparency 
could eliminate or reduce these problems. 
But identifying the risks and costs that could be ameliorated through 
direct holding and transparency reflects only part of the story.  It also is 
necessary to consider whether, how, and to what extent various positive 
externalities provided by intermediated infrastructures would be affected 
by adopting the elements of the NPS.  These benefits include in particular 
the flexibility that intermediation confers on intermediaries to use their 
account holders’ securities.  For example, this flexibility accommodates 
margin lending and securities lending, which are profitable activities for 
broker-dealers in the United States but also provide benefits to account 
holders.144  Part IV next considers some recent proposals for direct holding 
and increased transparency that generally fail to acknowledge, much less 
consider and evaluate, these benefits of intermediation and how they might 
be impaired by adoption of those proposals.  Part V then outlines the 
operation of the NPS and explains how the NPS might be structured to 
preserve much of the flexibility of the prevailing intermediated holding 
infrastructure.145 
The approach taken here provides a necessary framework for 
assessing the merits of adopting a direct-holding and transparent 
infrastructure.  This article makes a plausible (perhaps prima facie) case 
that the NPS could reduce significant risks and costs of intermediated 
holding while preserving many of the benefits of the current system.  But 
much remains to be addressed in future work.  Empirical assessments based 
on a cost-benefit analysis that would support significant regulatory or 
 
 144. See supra Part II, at pp. 17–19. 
 145. See infra Part V.B.7, at pp. 50–56. 
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legislative intervention require further qualitative and quantitative analysis 
of the factors identified here.146 
Consider first the market participants most directly affected by the 
existing intermediated infrastructure in the United States—broker-dealer 
and bank intermediary participants in DTC, investors, and issuers.  For 
these stakeholders, the current system is the only game in town for post-
settlement holding, but questions abound.147  For example, although the 
system benefits the intermediaries,148 are intermediary profits supported by 
the current system achieved at the expense of investors and issuers?  Would 
a modified post-settlement holding system, such as the NPS, lower the 
aggregate institutional economic transaction costs?  These costs include 
those related to reducing intermediary risk, including methods for the 
protection of account holder assets.149  Further work should address these 
questions, among others. 
The analysis also must take account of the various direct and indirect 
costs of the intermediated holding infrastructure that lie beyond the direct 
and indirect costs that are imposed on securities market participants.150  For 
example, the current system may inhibit AML regulation and efforts to 
control other forms of corruption and terrorist financing.  When compared 
to a more transparent system such as the NPS, intermediated holding not 
only may increase the costs of monitoring and reporting but it may be less 
effective. 
This article offers a framework for future work that would pursue a 
cost-benefit analysis of the United States securities holding infrastructure 
and an assessment of a move toward direct holding and transparency, such 
as the NPS.  However, the application of such an analysis is beyond the 
 
 146. I refer to “cost-benefit analysis” in the broadest sense of examining costs and 
benefits and social welfare implications of changes in law and regulation.  I take no position 
here on methodological issues.  Compare Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-
Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S351, S353 (2014) (questioning 
the utility of cost-benefit analysis in setting financial regulation and arguing that costs and 
benefits of rules cannot be meaningfully quantified) with Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, 
Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S1 (2014) (arguing that 
cost-benefit analysis is appropriate for financial regulation). 
 147. See supra Part II, at pp. 15–19. 
 148. See infra Part VII, at pp. 63–66. 
 149. See supra Part III.B.1, at p. 22. 
 150. See supra subparts III.D and III.E.  Moreover, further investigation and analysis 
might demonstrate that the current intermediated and nontransparent infrastructure imposes 
material costs in other contexts as well, such as the impairment of financial stability and 
national security.  Taking account of these costs that are manifested outside of the securities 
holding infrastructure per se would be within the SEC’s mandate.  See infra note 288; see 
generally Part VII (discussing the prospects for SEC intervention). 
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scope of this article. 
IV. RECENT PROPOSALS FOR DISINTERMEDIATION: FLAWS AND 
LACUNAE 
Several scholars recently have argued that disintermediation in the 
securities markets (including the adoption of various forms of “transparent” 
or “direct”—or both—holding systems) could yield a variety of benefits.  
Following are brief summaries and critiques of four recent articles.  My 
assessments identify some significant lacunae in these proposals and note 
several other concerns.  But these articles are welcome contributions to the 
literature and each offers some useful insights. 
George Geis argues that the current mechanics of stock transfer (and, 
implicitly, holding) in the United States have great importance for 
corporate law.151  He predicts that in the “coming years” DLT is “likely” to 
cause a “fundamental transformation” in the processes for settlement of 
transactions in corporate shares, although he also notes that such a change 
is “contingent” and “not inevitable.”152  Geis imagines that a DLT-based 
clearing and settlement process would produce what he calls “traceable 
shares”: “There would be a detailed and traceable record of title for every 
single share of stock.”  He notes that maintenance of such records would 
sharply contrast with the existing intermediated holding system in the 
United States, based on an investor’s “security entitlement” with respect to 
fungible bulks of securities held by intermediaries in omnibus accounts.153  
While he offers little detail as to the structure of the DLT system that he 
envisages, apparently the system would embrace trading platforms as well 
as clearing and settlement.  Presumably these records of traceable shares 
would constitute (or be a definitive component of) an issuer’s shareholder 
register (although the article does not make that explicit). 
Geis explains various problematic aspects of the current intermediated 
holding structure for corporate and securities regulation law, including 
shareholder claims and shareholder voting.154  He then argues that his idea 
of “traceable shares” would solve or ameliorate these problems.155  While 
 
 151. Geis, supra note 125, at 228. 
 152. Geis, supra note 125, at 230–31.  Geis offers little to support his optimism, 
however. 
 153. See supra text at notes 33–41. 
 154. Geis, supra note 125, at 238–54. 
 155. Geis, supra note 125, at 266–76.  In particular, Geis argues that “[t]raceable shares 
will also offer clarity in situations where legal rights are linked to an earlier disposition of 
specific shares and shareholders must prove this link to exercise their rights.”  Id. at 270.  
He examines shareholder suits under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 and appraisal 
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Geis’ analysis of specific issues is useful, these problematic aspects of 
intermediated holding systems for corporate governance and corporate 
actions and the palliative aspects of increased transparency are well known. 
Delphine Nougayrède makes a strong case for transparent CSDs—end 
investor segregation156—although she stops short of advocating a direct-
holding structure.157  Even aside from her cogent normative arguments, her 
careful and lucid study is impressive for its thorough but nuanced 
canvassing of global CSDs, including their roles, historical development, 
and various structures.158 
Nougayrède draws support for her normative case from several 
sources.  She notes the transparent systems that have been adopted in 
emerging markets, including China and Brazil.159  She also relies on the 
corporate governance problems for investors and issuers alike, such as 
voting and shareholder communications, which are imposed or exacerbated 
by the deep intermediation that exists in particular in the United States and 
the United Kingdom.160  For example, she notes the Eckerle case,161  which 
denied shareholder status to claimants that held indirectly through tiers of 
intermediaries, as a “textbook example of the legal risks resulting from 
multiple intermediation in a cross-border context.”162  Nougayrède also 
argues that a more transparent holding system could provide substantial 
benefits in the contexts of AML and anti-terrorist/sanctions compliance 
regulation as well as for the enforcement of withholding taxes in 
connection with distributions on financial assets.163  She draws further 
support for increased transparency from the potential of DLT and from 
what she perceives as an “evolutionary path” toward transparency (albeit in 
the contexts of AML and taxation, as opposed to capital markets 
regulation).164 
Nougayrède provides a valuable and thoughtful synopsis of the 
 
valuation claims as examples.  Id. at 270–72.  He posits that a plaintiff in a Section 11 case 
could check the “chain of title” to determine which shares would support a claim.  Id. at 
270. 
 156. See supra Part II (providing a discussion of transparent systems). 
 157. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 295–308. 
 158. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 280–91. 
 159. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 296–98. 
 160. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 298–301. 
 161. Eckerle & Others v. Wickeder Westfalenstahl GmbH & Another [2013] EWHC 
(Ch) 68 [2013] 3 WLR [1316] (Eng.). 
 162. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 299. 
 163. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 301–05. 
 164. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 305–08. 
2020] BEYOND INTERMEDIATION: A NEW (FINTECH) MODEL 421 
 
political economy of relevant reform.165  She recognizes the dual challenges 
for a transition to more transparent systems—path dependence and the 
opposition of financial intermediaries, including CSDs.166  She surmises, I 
believe correctly, that such reforms would require a greater role for policy 
makers and experts outside the securities industry sector.167  She 
acknowledges the important normative question of mandatory 
identification of investors to issuers versus an investor’s right to remain 
anonymous and the further issue of whether an investor’s interest should be 
publicly available.168  But Nougayrède aspires to end investor identification 
at the CSD level as a “functional tool,” not as a move that would 
necessarily make investor information public.169  She does not consider a 
move toward transparency to be a disruptive one that should trouble 
securities regulators.  But she argues that currently prevailing deep 
intermediation imposes hidden costs on both issuers and investors that 
regulators should consider.170  Finally, she notes the value of 
interdisciplinary research in fields that normally are addressed in “siloes,” 
such as securities regulation, corporate law, taxation, and AML.171 
David Donald and Mahdi Miraz (D&M) advocate a DLT-based 
system that would embrace both trading and settlement and that essentially 
would replace entirely existing legacy frameworks.172  Inasmuch as they 
acknowledge that existing systems for securities settlement are in general 
satisfactory, they call for a cost-benefit analysis of their proposed move to a 
comprehensive DLT-based framework.173  D&M recognize that the 
beneficiaries of current intermediated holding systems are unlikely to 
undertake or support the major market reorganization that they propose.  
Consequently, they address their proposal primarily to regulators 
responsible for broader market interests, and in particular those of investors 
and issuers.174 
 
 165. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 308–11.  These issues are addressed in infra Part 
VII. 
 166. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 308–09. 
 167. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 309. 
 168. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 309; see infra Part V.B.1 (discussing how direct 
registration under the NPS proposed here could nonetheless accommodate the NOBO/OBO 
system in the United States for permitting a shareholder to object to its identification to an 
issuer). 
 169. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 310. 
 170. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 310–11. 
 171. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 313. 
 172. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87. 
 173. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 1–2. 
 174. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 23–28, 38. 
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Like Geis, D&M make the case for a DLT-based settlement and 
direct-holding system based on corporate governance problems (mainly 
voting and other corporate actions) associated with existing intermediated 
holding in the United States.  As to voting problems, they rely primarily on 
Donald’s earlier study.175  But some arguments supporting 
disintermediation in the newer paper do not impress.  For example, they 
assert that their system would “return full power over the creation of 
securities to their issuers”176  and that the current intermediated system 
gives financial intermediaries the “power to create securities through book-
entry”177  and creates “the risk of overissued ‘shadow’ securities created by 
depositories.”178  D&M apparently confound shortfalls in securities 
maintained by intermediaries for account holders179  with the problem of 
overissued securities that they imagine.  The intermediated system clearly 
presents problems in the context of voting, but in no way does it impair the 
rights (and obligations) of issuers to recognize only holders of securities 
that appear on their registers.180  D&M’s whipping boy is the private-law 
framework for security entitlements embodied in UCC Article 8, which 
they misconstrue and incorrectly describe as having “invented” a “property 
right for this essentially contractual relationship” between an intermediary 
and an account holder.181  But their critique of Article 8 is misplaced.  
Article 8 provides a coherent legal regime for the securities holding 
infrastructure that has prevailed in the United States for decades.  It 
acknowledges and adapts the law to the deeply intermediated holding 
infrastructure as it exists.  Indeed, if there is a “villain” in the D&M story it 
would be the pervasive shortfalls tolerated by regulation in the United 
States markets. 
Unlike Geis, D&M offer a detailed and thoughtful description of how 
DLT could be employed in restructured systems for trading and 
settlement.182  They contemplate a private/permissioned ledger featuring an 
intraday “lightening” system for instantaneous recording of trades with 
 
 175. Donald, supra note 87. 
 176. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 12. 
 177. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 11. 
 178. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 12. 
 179. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing shortfalls and intermediary risk). 
 180. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (West 2006) (describing who gets to vote). 
 181. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 7.  I need not 
elaborate further on D&M’s misunderstanding of the Article 8 framework, its statutory 
predecessors, and its relationship to the intermediated holding system problems that they 
lament.  On the historical background and development of Article 8, see Mooney, 
Individuals, supra note 105 (history and evolution of Article 8). 
 182. Donald & Miraz, Multilateral Transparency for Securities, supra note 87, at 28–37. 
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results reflected in a day-end DLT ledger.183  Curiously, given their 
otherwise comprehensive description of their proposed infrastructure, 
D&M (like Geis) fail to mention how an investor, in the direct holding 
system they posit, would access an issuer’s register and directly control 
securities (i.e., effect transfers) without the involvement of an intermediary. 
Frederico Panisi, Ross Buckley, and Douglas Arner (PB&A) also 
focus primarily on the disconnection between beneficial shareholders and 
issuers under intermediated holding systems.184  Their principal claim is 
that “blockchain could enable the tracking of share ownership through the 
complete settlement cycle, enhancing the ‘shareholder democracy’ of listed 
companies.”185  After surveying historical developments resulting in the 
prevailing, omnibus account-based intermediated holding systems,186 they 
identify several various recent developments from which they conclude that 
a blockchain-based restructuring of securities holding systems may be 
plausible.187 
PB&A argue that a blockchain-based architecture could provide 
“ownership transparency” and streamline “proxy-voting” through real-time 
identification of “beneficial shareholders.”188  This echoes in general the 
similar position advocated by Geis.189  Unlike Geis, however, PB&A stop 
short of proposing a direct-holding system and are satisfied to advocate a 
transparent approach while retaining current intermediation—thus their 
many references (including in the article’s title) to “proxy-voting.”190  In 
their view, blockchain could enhance the accuracy and efficiency of voting 
mechanisms even within an intermediated system—”the use of blockchain 
platforms leads to systems in which voting rights can be exercised directly 
and simply by their owners.”191  Similarly, they argue that blockchain-
based enhanced transparency also could allow regulators to identify and 
 
 183. Donald & Miraz, Multilateral Transparency for Securities, supra note 87, at 13–23.  
It is not clear from their description why netting of intraday trades under legacy technology 
would not produce the same results as the system they propose. 
 184. Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135.  PB&A make many references to 
“securities,” but their normative analysis is limited to shares of companies (corporations) 
and they do not address explicitly how, if at all, they contemplate that a blockchain-based 
system would deal with debt securities. 
 185. Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, at 2. 
 186. Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, at 3–6. 
 187. Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, at 9–12. 
 188. Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, at 11–12. 
 189. See supra text accompanying notes 154–155.  PB&A cite Geis once with a “[s]ee 
also” signal.  Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, at 28 n.77. 
 190. Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, passim. 
 191. Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, at 12.  They point specifically to one 
model for such a voting mechanism but note that “[o]ther models are available as well.” 
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monitor systemic risks imposed by complicated rehypothecation chains.192  
Finally, PB&A offer a candid and thoughtful cautionary note as to the 
downsides of ownership transparency, especially the data privacy risks; 
they advocate a balancing of privacy concerns with the benefits of 
transparency.193 
All of these authors recognize that current intermediated systems 
impose costs on investors and issuers while the status quo generally favors 
intermediaries and CSDs.  But none of these articles seriously engages with 
the claims, analyses, and proposals made in any earlier article discussed 
here. The following comments aspire to engage with all four. 
Remarkably these observers failed to explore, much less emphasize, 
the principal negative externalities imposed by intermediated holding 
systems—post-settlement intermediary risk and its attendant costs—and the 
potential for disintermediation to reduce or eliminate those risks and costs.  
These risks and the myriad prophylactic methods (with their attendant 
costs) for their reduction and control have been the cornerstone of the 
regulatory approaches to intermediated securities holding systems.194  To be 
sure, I make no claim that there is anything wrong with a study and 
analysis of particular problems.  But it is stunning that articles ostensibly 
addressed to lawmakers and regulators seem oblivious to these core risks 
and related costs imposed by intermediated holding systems. 
That said, it also is clear that the adoption of a direct-holding system 
as generally proposed by Geis and D&M would have the laudable effect of 
reducing intermediary risk.  But neither of these articles examined how the 
proposed structures would accommodate an investor’s direct exercise of 
rights and powers vis-à-vis an issuer without the involvement of an 
intermediary.195  Such a feature would be essential for the systems they 
propose to provide the functional benefits of direct holding.  How to 
accommodate such investor control is a challenging but enormously 
important issue in the context of a permissioned DLT-based securities 
settlement and holding system as well as for digital assets more generally.  
This issue is addressed below in connection with the operation of the 
NPS.196 
The reforms advocated by Nougayrède and PB&A, while advocating 
 
 192. Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, at 12. 
 193. Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, at 14–16. 
 194. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 195. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the inability to exercise rights directly as an 
element of intermediary risk). 
 196. See infra Part VI (discussing potential application of DLT under the NPS and role 
of investor control). 
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useful transparency, fall short of a direct holding structure that would 
provide investors with direct control over securities.  Moreover, none 
of these articles adequately deals with debt securities.  Geis and PB&A 
focus exclusively on shares of stock and fail to include even a passing 
reference to debt.  Nougayrède does recognize the important role and 
stature of debt securities in the financial markets.197  But “[i]n order to keep 
things simple,” she focuses instead on “‘national’ CSDs that handle the 
registration of equities (i.e. stocks and shares in corporations).”198  D&M 
also mention debt securities, apparently contemplating that their DLT 
system would embrace debt as well as equities.199  But they are silent as to 
how their system could incorporate outstanding issues of debt securities (i) 
evidenced by global certificates, or (ii) required to be held by or through 
CSDs.  In contrast, Part VII considers how such debt securities could be 
dealt with in the implementation of the NPS. 
Perhaps most significant, none of these articles confronts the potential 
disruption and impairment of flexibility and business practices inherent in 
deeply intermediated systems that the respective proposed reforms would 
impose.  These are particularly significant omissions for the direct-holding 
systems contemplated by Geis and D&M.200  These practices include use by 
intermediaries of investor securities, including as collateral and for 
rehypothecation and securities lending, the treatment of fails to deliver 
securities in the settlement process, and the treatment of shortfalls more 
generally.201  Parts V and VII consider how these practices would be 
affected by and dealt with under the NPS.  As noted there, the costs of 
eliminating this flexibility could outweigh the benefits of implementing a 
direct-holding system.202  While D&M laudably suggest a possible role for 
a cost-benefit analysis,203 these omissions substantially weaken the Geis 
and D&M stand-alone proposals for a direct-holding system. 
Each of these proposals offers support for beneficial changes to 
prevailing legacy intermediated holding systems and, in the case of Geis 
 
 197. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 282 n.21. 
 198. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 282. 
 199. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 28, 30. 
 200. The transparent systems advocated by Nougayrède and PB&A would not be as 
disruptive, however.  PB&A also explain that enhanced transparency could provide a useful 
means for regulators to monitor risks imposed by, for example, “the abuse of 
‘rehypothecation’ [that] can lead to liquidity illusions as well as complicated ownership 
knots that endanger systemic financial stability.”  Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, 
at 12. 
 201. See infra Parts V.B.7, VII (discussing these issues). 
 202. See infra text accompanying note 258. 
 203. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 4. 
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and D&M, potentially improved systems for trading.  But implementation 
of each proposal also would impose varying degrees of disruption along 
with corresponding resistance from interests that would be adversely 
affected—in particular from intermediaries and CSDs.204  This opposition 
may have enormous influence with regulators and other lawmakers.  Even 
assuming the most disruptive proposals (Geis and D&M) were optimal, 
they will prove to be of little practical benefit if never adopted.  Parts V, 
VI, and VII build the case that the less ambitious but more palatable NPS 
proposal may offer better prospects for meaningful reform.  It would 
preserve intermediated holding as an option, perhaps as an incremental 
step, and accommodate flexibility for rehypothecation, securities lending, 
and fails to deliver. 
The Geis, D&M, and PB&A studies seem to be inspired primarily by 
a desire to advocate the potential virtues of DLT.  Curiously, however, 
none of them seriously engages in an analysis of whether, why, or how a 
DLT-based system would be better suited than legacy technology for the 
modified infrastructures that they advocate.  (Many readers may note that 
these authors’ omissions are not unique in this genre of the literature.)  It is 
important, here, to distinguish the legacy infrastructures from the legacy 
technology.  These scholars of legal regimes affecting financial markets are 
certainly qualified to weigh in on needed reforms to financial 
infrastructures.  But in the absence of a thorough and compelling cost-
benefit analysis of these (potentially) competing technologies, an RFP to 
Fintech as to how reformed infrastructures could best be implemented 
would offer a better approach than unsupported advocacy of DLT. 
Finally, these authors advocate DLT-based solutions for addressing 
the particular problem areas that interest them.  For Geis and PB&A those 
areas are in general corporate actions, primarily shareholder voting.  D&M 
demonstrate great interest in trading and settlement systems, but they also 
emphasize the negative impact of existing intermediated holding systems 
on issuers and on the property interests of investors.  Nougayrède, on the 
other hand, engages in a more holistic assessment of the various negative 
effects of deeply intermediated holding systems across the spectrum of 
legal and regulatory domains.  She addresses DLT as a possible approach 
to addressing the problems that she identifies and as an incentive that might 
increase the prospects for reforms.  My perspective aligns more closely 
with Nougayrède’s approach.  Appeals for reforms made to lawmakers and 
regulators would be more likely to be successful if they identify problems 
and solutions for the broad swath of issues affected by legacy intermediated 
 
 204. See generally infra Part VII (discussing industry resistance). 




V. THE NEW PLATFORM SYSTEM: A FINTECH PATH TO 
DISINTERMEDIATED HOLDING 
A. General Approach, Assumptions, and Qualifications 
The core concept of the NPS is not new.  It would connect a 
participating investor directly with an issuer on the issuer’s register at the 
end of each settlement cycle—direct registration instead of intermediation.  
What is new, however, may be the realistic prospect for meaningful (if not 
complete) disintermediation of securities holding without a major 
disruption of significant features of the current market infrastructures.  
What also is new is a central feature of the NPS that would give a direct-
holding investor the exclusive power at any time to transfer securities and 
exclusive control over securities that it holds in the NPS. 
If the NPS would facilitate the movement of financial assets in and out 
of the system and, a fortiori, the transfer of securities within the NPS, it 
could be adapted as the primary system for trading and settlement, as well 
as holding, and as a wholesale replacement for legacy intermediated 
systems.  That notion underlies the potential of the NPS as a “primordial 
soup,” explained in Part VI.  But trading platforms and systems for 
clearance and settlement of securities transactions involve much more than 
an efficient system for free transferability among its participants.  For 
example, settlement systems (at least as we know them) must be connected 
with both trading platforms and DVP systems.  And they must ensure 
timely settlements of payments and deliveries notwithstanding a payment 
or delivery default by one or more system participants.205 
This Part describes the NPS and explains how it would modify 
securities holding systems.  The goal is not to propose and defend an 
optimal structure but to explore the simplest and least disruptive 
modifications of the financial market infrastructure necessary to achieve 
meaningful reduction of risks and costs through direct holding. 
This NPS might be an interim step or it (or a variation) might be 
sufficient for the long term.  It would not replace all of the trading, 
clearing, and settlement processes in a given market but would leave much 
 
 205. See supra Part III.A (discussing risks in securities settlement systems and the 
mechanisms to manage these risks). 
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of the current processes intact.206  This nondisruptive approach could blunt 
opposition to implementing the NPS and encourage cooperation by affected 
market participants—e.g., securities issuers, transfer agents, brokerage 
firms, paying and clearing banks, exchanges and other trading systems, and 
CSDs.  The NPS also could facilitate implementation in the securities 
markets of a DLT-based system earlier than otherwise might be feasible.  
As discussed in Part VII, however, potential opposition should not be 
underestimated. 
In the cross-border context, the proposal contemplates that all of the 
major securities markets would establish functionally similar versions of 
the NPS that would connect the relevant market participants.  Foreign 
custodians or foreign investors would have direct access to any foreign 
NPS, thereby shortening or even eliminating cross-border custody chains. 
This description and analysis of the NPS adopts a “functional” 
approach that emphasizes the results, relationships, and effects that the 
NPS seeks to achieve.  It places much less emphasis on the details of the 
necessary technology.  It proceeds on the basis that any holding system, 
including the NPS, must deal with market participants’ needs that are 
currently addressed by existing intermediated holding systems.  The 
proposal is best seen as an RFP to the Fintech community to create a 
system that meets the functional goals and results required of the NPS.  On 
the other hand, in order to identify and explain those goals and results, it is 
necessary here to flesh out some details of the NPS. 
The applicable local law (e.g., New York law, supplemented by the 
relevant United States federal regulatory regime for securities markets) 
would govern the rights of investors participating in the NPS except to the 
extent the laws governing the underlying securities and the issuer’s 
obligations apply (such as the corporate law governing shares or the law 
governing debt securities).  One or more “operators” would maintain the 
NPS based on software designed to achieve its goals.207  The NPS and its 
 
 206. Although the NPS (at least initially) would leave settlement systems in place, I do 
not suggest that these systems could not be improved.  See, e.g., Milne, supra note 67, at 
349–50 (noting complexity in settlement systems and potential systemic risk).  But clearing 
and settlement are short-term processes and most of the problems discussed in Part III arise 
from longer-term post-settlement holding. 
 207. The NPS proposal is agnostic as to the identity and number of operators.  One 
might imagine existing CSDs as the logical entities to serve as operators.  Or, a 
decentralized model could be employed that involved multiple, licensed and regulated 
operators, each of which would serve as agents for a subset of issuers.  But that 
configuration would require sharing of the information in all of the systems, functioning in 
effect as a single system.  For a suggestion of a similar approach for secured transactions 
registries, see Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Fintech and Secured Transactions Systems of the 
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operators would be regulated under the relevant applicable local law (e.g., 
United States federal law regulating securities markets).  The operator(s) 
would not, however, assume a role analogous to that of an intermediary 
under current systems.  For example, they would not receive and follow 
instructions from investors and they would not incur obligations to 
investors beyond the general obligation to operate the NPS properly.  
However, as described below, investors could access the NPS directly to 
transfer and receive transfers of securities. 
Given that old habits die hard, some might think the NPS not suitable 
for all investors—at least in its initial, potentially interim, stage.  For this 
reason, investors would be allowed to opt in to the NPS or to remain either 
account holders of intermediaries or direct holders of securities under the 
existing legacy systems, which would continue to exist. 
For simplicity of explication, this discussion addresses “simple” 
securities transactions involving equity and debt securities traded on an 
exchange or alternative trading system and clearance and settlement in the 
DTCC system in New York.  But the essential components and attributes of 
the NPS would be compatible with major CSDs and post-trade systems 
globally. 
B. Structure and Operation of New Platform System 
This subpart describes and explains the rights, interests, and status of 
an investor holding securities under the NPS.  It also outlines the 
operational steps and resulting legal relationships involved in the NPS, 
including the acquisition and disposition of securities by an investor, 
transfers of security interests and other limited interests, broker-transactor 
payments and receipts, exercise of investor rights (including corporate 
actions and voting), and cross-border custody and holding. 
1. Status of Investor Following Acquisition of Securities 
Upon completion of a securities transaction (post-settlement), under 
the NPS, an investor would acquire and hold a discrete number of shares or 
amount of debt of an issue of securities.208  The NPS itself would constitute 
 
Future, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 11–18 (2018). 
 208. The status of an account holder of a securities intermediary varies widely among 
differing legal systems and differing intermediated holding systems.  See supra Part II 
(discussing prevailing intermediated holding infrastructures).  But in intermediated holding 
systems the account holder does not actually achieve a direct holding relationship with the 
issuer.  Id. 
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the issuer’s register for purposes of their holdings.209  The number or 
amount of securities allocated to investors in the relevant securities under 
the NPS necessarily would reflect the exact number or amount allocated on 
the books of the issuer.  Allocation of securities to an investor would 
identify the investor by name (or other identifier).  However, the NPS 
could accommodate requirements for the protection of the identity of 
security holders.  For example, in the United States, SEC rules prohibit 
broker-dealers from disclosing to an issuer the identity of a shareholder 
who objects to that disclosure (an objecting beneficial owner, or OBO, as 
opposed to a non-objecting beneficial owner, or NOBO).210  The NPS could 
provide OBOs with that option.211 
One might be tempted to view the role of the NPS as analogous to that 
of an intermediary under current intermediated holding systems.  It is 
“intermediate” inasmuch as in some sense it lies between the investor and 
the issuer—it constitutes a component of the issuer’s register of security 
holders.  But, unlike an intermediary, the NPS operators would not be 
entering debits and credits to investors’ accounts.  Instead, as discussed 
below,212 in the NPS the authorized investors, broker-transactors, issuers, 
and banks would be entering transaction data directly.  Functionally, the 
NPS is more accurately seen as a variation on a traditional transfer agent to 
which an issuer has outsourced responsibility to maintain its register.  The 
differences, of course, would be that the authorized persons would enter 
data directly and the NPS would serve that function for many issuers and as 
a part of a unified system that would connect the various market 
 
 209. This might necessitate the revision of applicable corporate laws and amendments of 
the organic records of issuers, such as corporate charters and by-laws or contractual 
arrangements (e.g., indentures or trust deeds) in the case of debt securities.  For a discussion 
of such amendments for debt securities, see infra Part VII. 
 210. ALAN L. BELLER & JANET L. FISHER, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, THE 
OBO/NOBO DISTINCTION IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP: IMPLICATIONS FOR SHAREOWNER 
COMMUNICATIONS AND VOTING (2010), https://www.cii.org/files/publications/white_papers/
02_18_10_obo_nobo_distinction_white_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6Z8-UYXJ]. 
 211. In the DTCC system, securities held by OBOs would be among with those held on 
the issuer’s registry in the name of DTC’s nominee, Cede & Co.  The NPS could provide a 
self-contained definitive record of relevant information with respect to each participating 
investor and its holdings.  But to accommodate OBOs, the aggregate number of such 
securities held by OBOs might appear to an issuer as a single “omnibus” entry on the 
issuer’s registry.  In general, the NPS would allow each issuer to have access to the 
information with respect to security holders (subject to the rights of OBOs).  The combined 
NPS records and records maintained in the issuer’s legacy registry would provide complete 
records with respect to the security holders. 
 212. See infra Parts V.B.3, 4 (discussing disposition of securities by an investor and 
transfers of security interests and other limited interests by an investor). 
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participants.  This would distinguish it from a transfer agent maintaining a 
stand-alone register for a discrete issuer. 
2. Acquisition of Securities by an Investor 
An investor participating in the NPS typically would acquire securities 
in a market transaction by retaining a broker-dealer (whose role in the NPS 
is referred to as a “broker-transactor”) to acquire the securities in the 
market—just as under the current system.  In general, the NPS would not 
impact the trading processes or the DTCC settlement process.213  The 
investor’s payment obligation to the broker-transactor could be handled 
conventionally by funding a securities account maintained with the 
investor’s broker-transactor.214  Alternatively, the broker-transactor could 
be connected directly to the investors’ sources of funding.215 
At the end of the settlement process, after all credits to DTC 
participants had been made, instead of the investor’s broker-transactor 
crediting the investor’s securities account, the relevant number or amount 
of the securities would be removed from the broker-transactor’s DTC 
participant account and allocated to the NPS for the benefit of the 
investor.216 
In addition to acquiring securities from sources outside the NPS, an 
investor could acquire securities within the NPS pursuant to a “free 
transfer” initiated by another NPS securities holder.  These transfers are 
discussed in subpart V.B.4. 
 
 
 213. See supra Parts II, III.A (discussing the settlement process and settlement-related 
risks). 
 214. Funds that a broker-transactor is entitled to receive or obligated to pay arising out of 
NPS transactions settling on a settlement date would be treated in the same manner as other 
transactions initiated by the broker-transactor.  They would figure in the calculation of the 
single netted amount that the broker-transactor is entitled to receive or obligated to pay on 
that date.  See supra Part III.A (discussing settlement). 
 215. Presumably a broker-transactor would only act for an investor with a securities 
account with the broker-transactor, even if the investor did not contemplate holding security 
entitlements in the account post-settlement. 
 216. The NPS could likewise accommodate inputs from sources other than DTCC 
settlement process or internal transfers.  For example, a direct holder in an issuer’s legacy 
register might instruct the issuer to convert the holdings to the NPS, an entitlement holder 
might instruct its securities intermediary to so convert its holdings, or a bank participant in 
the DTC might transfer securities to an investor in the NPS. 
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3. Disposition of Securities by an Investor 
The linchpin of the NPS would be an investor’s exclusive and 
absolute control over directly held securities so as to permit dispositions 
(transfers) of securities by investors on the real-time, nonintermediated 
NPS platform.  This is a defining attribute that would distinguish the NPS 
from holding systems that feature transparency but nonetheless embrace 
intermediary control over securities.217  An RFP for this attribute would 
likely present the most important—and the most difficult—challenge for 
Fintech in the development and implementation of the NPS.  The 
mechanism for investor control in the NPS must accommodate not only 
professional, institutional securities market participants but also individual 
holders and all types of investors in between.  It must be secure, including 
its systems for the identification of investors (and transferees of security 
interests and other limited interests)218 while also being user friendly.  This 
challenge is addressed below in the discussion of the potential for a DLT-
based NPS,219 but it must be faced and met regardless of the technologies 
that the NPS might employ. 
An investor’s disposition of securities would in essence be the mirror 
image of the methods of acquisition described above.  For example, an 
investor could instruct its broker-transactor to sell securities and release 
(i.e., transfer) the relevant securities to the broker-transactor.  On the 
settlement date, the investor would receive funds in its securities account or 
in accordance with the investor’s standing payment instructions.  Or the 
investor could transfer securities to another eligible holder within the NPS 




 217. See supra Parts III.B.1, C (discussing default or failure of a relevant intermediary 
and the exercise of investor rights). 
 218. On the role and importance of digital identities in financial infrastructures, see 
DOUGLAS W. ARNER, ROSS P. BUCKLEY & DIRK A. ZETZSCHE, ALL. FOR FIN. INCLUSION, 
FINTECH FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION: A FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL FINANCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION 9–11 (2018), https://www.afi-global.org/publications/2844/FinTech-for-F
inancial-Inclusion-A-Framework-for-Digital-Financial-Transformation [https://perma.cc/9N
DJ-PC35]; OECD, DIG IDENTITY MANAGEMENT: ENABLING INNOVATION AND TRUST IN THE 
INTERNET ECONOMY 8 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/49338380.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/46TG-FGTZ]. 
 219. See infra Part VI (considering the potential for adopting a DLT-based system for 
the operation of the NPS). 
 220. See infra Part V.B.4. 
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4. Transfers of Security Interests and Other Limited Interests by 
Investor 
The NPS would provide flexible and versatile mechanisms for the 
transfer by an investor of security interests and other limited interests221 in 
securities.  Unlike outright transfers of securities from one investor to 
another investor, these limited interests would be reflected by a designation 
in the NPS system while the investor would remain the registered, direct 
holder of the securities.  The designation would have the effect of 
“perfection” of the limited interest (i.e., general effectiveness as against 
third parties such as competing creditors and an investor’s insolvency 
representative).  This system would be similar to designation systems that 
exist under other regimes.222  It could accommodate senior and junior 
interests created by the investor in the same securities.  Moreover, a unique 
feature of the system could permit the holder of a security interest to create, 
as grantor/transferor, a security interest in the securities.  This would 
accommodate “repledge” or “rehypothecation” transactions.223 
The NPS could provide additional flexibility as well.  An investor 
could identify a class of securities that would be covered by a designation 
without any further action.  For example, the designation could apply to all 
securities from time to time held by the investor in the NPS or all securities 
of a specified type (e.g., described by issuer(s), by class (equities or debt 
securities), or other descriptions).  Such a designation also could apply to 
securities of the relevant class that might be acquired from time to time.  
The NPS regime should avoid a rigid “book-entry” system that requires 
separate, individual entries as securities of a particular description are 
acquired.224  The system also could allow for a designation to be 
 
 221. The limited interests could include fractional interests in a security or specialized 
interests under the applicable law, such as a usufruct. 
 222. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, arts. (1)(l), 12(3)(b), (5) (providing for 
Contracting State’s declaration that “under its law” an interest may be made effective by a 
“designated entry” on a securities account in favor of a person other than the account 
holder). 
 223. See infra Part V.B.7 (discussing repledge transactions by broker-dealers as debtors 
in the context of proposed synthetic margin accounts within the NPS).  The NPS would be 
capable of reflecting a security interest with the investor as debtor and the broker-dealer as 
secured party and with the broker-dealer as debtor and the creditor of broker-dealer as 
secured party, while leaving the investor as registered holder of record of the securities.  
While the NPS designation system might permit an indication of the basic type of interest 
being designated (e.g., security interest, repledge, etc.), the actual terms of the underlying 
transactions would be memorialized between the parties separately and outside of the NPS. 
 224. See Kumiko Koens & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Security Interests in Book-Entry 
Securities in Japan: Should Japanese Law Embrace Perfection by Control Agreement and 
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accompanied by provision for which party or parties would possess the 
right to dispose of (transfer) securities subject to a designation.  For 
example, either an investor or the investor’s designated secured party might 
have such a power, or it might be conferred on the secured party alone.  Or, 
a secured party of a broker-dealer in a repledge transaction might have the 
exclusive power to dispose.  In the absence of specific instructions, a 
default rule might be established (e.g., a secured party or, if applicable, a 
repledge secured party, might have exclusive power to dispose in the 
absence of any contrary instructions).  Moreover, the NPS could 
accommodate self-executing contractual performance or enforcement of 
obligations through “smart contracts” or “transactional scripts.”225 
5. Exercise of Investor Rights (Voting, Corporate Actions, Claims 
Against Issuers, Etc.) 
Because investors holding in the NPS would hold directly on the 
registers of issuers, the many problems imposed by intermediated holding 
for the exercise of investor rights could be eliminated.  The risks and costs 
imposed by intermediated holding in this context were considered above.226  
The NPS direct-holding structure would offer a straightforward path for the 
exercise of investor rights, such as voting, the assertion of claims against 
issuers, and communications between issuers and investors. 
The NPS would be structured to handle all corporate actions requiring 
voting and deliveries of proxies.  The NPS also would be structured to 
permit investors to receive communications and take all other actions 
through the system. 
Although the NPS, at least as an initial measure, would not 
incorporate payment mechanisms, the identification of investors in the 
direct-holding environment also would facilitate distributions of funds to 
investors outside of the NPS.  In the United States, however, the 
NOBO/OBO convention would complicate the payments process inasmuch 
as issuers would not have information as to the identities of the OBOs.  For 
the receipt of dividends payments, issuers would treat NOBO investors the 
same as other direct holders of securities in legacy registers.  For OBO 
 
Security Interests in Securities Accounts?, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 761, 794–802 (2017) 
(proposing revisions to Japanese law to overcome such rigidity by providing for perfection 
by control agreement and for security interests in securities accounts). 
 225. See Kevin Werbach, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF TRUST 160–
63 (2018) (discussing smart contracts, the distinction between contractual execution and 
enforcement, and the continued relevance of law and litigation). 
 226. See supra Part III.C. 
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investors, the issuers would pay the relevant broker-transactors for those 
investors, as under the current system, necessarily imposing some 
intermediary risk. 
6. “Cross-Border” Holdings and Custody Chains 
The custody-chain risks (e.g., failure or nonliability of sub-custodian, 
inability of investor to enforce rights against issuer, etc.) were described in 
Part III.B.2.  These risks could be eliminated in cross-border holding 
situations in the same way they could be eliminated under the NPS 
operating, for example, in the United States.  The simplest scenario would 
be for an investor in State A to be entered as the direct holder in the State B 
NPS.  Alternatively, an investor may wish to hold in State B through an 
intermediary.  It plausibly might consider a global custodian to be better 
equipped, as a repeat player, to deal efficiently with the foreign NPS.  Even 
so, involving only one intermediary would avoid the exacerbated custody-
chain risk of holding through a chain of intermediaries across borders. 
These structures need not raise significant regulatory issues or 
concerns in State B (though it might be necessary to clarify that under State 
B law a foreign custodian can hold securities through the State B NPS).  
Either the investor or the custodian would be holding merely as a direct 
holder in the State B NPS.  Neither would need to be a participant in the 
State B CSD or participate directly in the State B systems for trading, 
clearance, and settlement—all of which would be handled by a State B 
broker-transactor. 
The establishment of identical (or functionally so) versions of the NPS 
in all major financial markets would require substantial cooperation, 
coordination, and harmonization of laws, regulations, and operations.  This 
should not be underestimated.  But it would be much less challenging than 
global harmonization of systems for trading, clearance, and settlement or 
creating a cross-border “international” NPS.  Moreover, existing and 
relevant organizations are well suited to organize the necessary processes 
of harmonization for implementation of the NPS.227 
 
 227. See Mooney, supra note 89, at 542–46 (proposing development of global standards 
for securities holding infrastructures to be led by IOSCO). 
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7. NPS Accommodation and Coexistence with Use of Investor 
Securities (Rehypothecation, Securities Lending, and the United 
States Customer Protection Rule) and Treatment of Fails to 
Deliver 
A principal challenge for the adoption of any direct-holding system 
for securities, including the NPS, would be the accommodation and 
preservation of the flexibility afforded by the various and sundry practices 
generically referred to as the “use of investor securities” by securities 
intermediaries.  As a prime example, the following discussion focuses on 
how the NPS could coexist with the Customer Protection Rule (CPR) 
applicable to broker-dealers in the United States.228  Another challenge 
would be to structure a direct-holding system so as to avoid unnecessary 
disruption of current approaches to “fails to deliver” and “fails to receive” 
securities in the settlement process.  As explained above, customer 
accounts in the United States normally are credited with securities even 
though the relevant securities have not yet been received in settlement.229  
The following discussion illustrates how this flexibility could be 
maintained under the NPS.  As noted above, other proponents of direct-
holding systems have essentially ignored these problems.230 
The discussion requires a brief overview of the CPR (for ease of 
explanation this general summary takes considerable liberty toward 
simplification).231  The basic operative rule provides: “A broker or dealer 
shall promptly obtain and shall thereafter maintain the physical possession 
or control of all fully-paid securities and excess margin securities carried 
by a broker or dealer for the account of customers.”232  “Fully-paid 
securities” are those for which a customer has made full payment and are 
credited to a securities account in which the broker-dealer does not have a 
security interest (or as to which there is no secured obligation 
outstanding).233  Securities other than fully-paid securities and credited to a 
 
 228. See supra Part II (discussing CPR, margin lending, and securities lending). 
 229. See supra Part II (discussing fails to deliver/receive). 
 230. See supra Part IV (discussing other proposals). 
 231. See Mooney, supra note 66, at 166–82 (providing a brief overview of the Customer 
Protection Rule and its effects in the case of a broker-dealer insolvency proceeding).  See 
Michael P. Jamroz, The Customer Protection Rule, 57 BUS. LAW. 1069 (2002) (providing a 
more detailed examination). 
 232. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(1)(b) (2019) (emphasis added).  For cash balances owed by 
the broker-dealer to the customer, the broker-dealer must “back up” its obligation by 
maintaining a special reserve account with cash or government securities according to a 
reserve formula.  17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-3(a), (e)(1) (2019). 
 233. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(a)(3) (2019). 
2020] BEYOND INTERMEDIATION: A NEW (FINTECH) MODEL 437 
 
securities account (a “margin account”) in which the broker-dealer does 
have a security interest are “margin securities.”234  “Excess margin 
securities” are margin securities with “a market value in excess of 140 
percent of” the account holder’s secured obligation to the broker dealer.235  
For example, if securities valued at $200 are credited to a customer’s 
margin account and the secured debt owed to the broker-dealer is $100, the 
value of the “excess margin securities” is $60 (the market value in excess 
of 140 percent of $100, or $140).  It follows that the broker-dealer must 
maintain possession and control236 of the relevant securities of a value of at 
least $60.  It may “use” the securities valued of up to $140 (non-excess 
margin securities) by granting a security interest to a lender (a so-called 
“repledge” or “rehypothecation”) or by “lending” the securities.237  
Although the broker-dealer must maintain possession and control of the 
excess margin securities valued at $60, those securities would remain 
subject to the broker-dealer’s security interest. 
The nub of the problem in reconciling the NPS (or any direct-holding 
system) with the CPR and current treatment of fails to deliver is 
straightforward.  First, it must be possible for securities directly registered 
in the name an investor in the NPS nonetheless to be effectively held by a 
broker-dealer as collateral—perfection by designation under the NPS 
would meet this requirement.238  The securities also must be freely 
transferable by the broker-dealer, for example for purposes of repledge or 
securities lending.  Second, securities that are not received in the settlement 
process would not be available for registration in the name of an acquiring 
investor under the NPS.  Potential solutions to this problem are not so 
straightforward, but viable and effective approaches are available. 
I do not advocate here that this flexibility should be retained, primarily 
because affirmatively making the empirical case that the benefits would 
outweigh the costs is beyond the scope of this article.  Maintaining current 
approaches would preserve and impose on broker-dealers, investors, and 
 
 234. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(a)(4) (2019). 
 235. Id. 
 236. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-3(b), (c) (2019). 
 237. See Mooney, supra note 66 (explaining securities lending transactions).  The 
broker-dealer’s “use” of securities is not without other restrictions for the protection of the 
customer, however.  For example, the broker-dealer’s borrowings against customer 
securities must be entered as a credit in its reserve account.  17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3a 
(2019). In addition, under the so-called “hypothecation restriction,” the broker-dealer is not 
permitted to pledge its account holders’ securities to secure indebtedness in an amount 
“which exceeds the aggregate indebtedness of all customers in respect of securities carried 
for their accounts.”  17 C.F.R. §§ 240.8c-1(a)(3), 240.15c2-1(a)(3) (2019). 
 238. See supra Part V.B.4. 
438 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 22:2 
 
regulators the considerable complexity inherent in the CPR.  But if such 
flexibility is politically necessary for the implementation of the NPS, the 
following analysis demonstrates the feasibility of the NPS-CPR 
coexistence.  Moreover, aside from political expediency, the benefits to 
broker-dealers and customers of access to credit through margin lending 
may well justify the maintenance of the current structure (or at least a 
system with equivalent flexibility).239  With this in mind, consider two 
alternative approaches, the goals of which would be to maximize the extent 
of direct registration of investor holdings while maintaining the flexibility 
and benefits of the current system. 
The first alternative would be to require margin accounts to be 
maintained by broker-dealers under a system equivalent to the current 
regime.  Excess margin securities (in the example, valued at $60) could be 
registered in the investor’s name under the NPS, subject to the broker-
dealer’s security interest designated in the NPS, but for purposes of the 
CPR the excess margin securities would be treated as if they were credited 
to the margin account.  The non-excess margin securities (in the example, 
valued at $140) would be credited to the customer’s actual margin 
account.240  Inasmuch as holding securities in the legacy intermediated 
system would remain as an available option after implementation of the 
NPS, this approach would not be problematic from an operational 
standpoint.  But it obviously would dilute the effectiveness and benefits of 
the NPS by disqualifying the non-excess margin securities from the NPS 
direct-holding system.  Moreover, it is possible that the costs of 
implementing and administering the NPS would not be warranted if those 
securities were made ineligible. 
A second alternative may be more promising: All margin securities 
would be eligible for holding under the NPS.  Instead of a “margin 
account” maintained by a broker-dealer under the legacy holding system, 
an investor could establish a “synthetic margin account” with a broker-
transactor as a feature of the NPS.  Under this arrangement, the investor 
and broker-dealer would agree to the securities held in the NPS that would 
be covered by the synthetic account.  These could include, for example, all 
securities of any issue held by the investor in the NPS, securities only of 
specified issues and up to any specified number or amount, or a specified 
number or amount of a specified issue of securities.  The covered securities 
 
 239. It seems clear that the CPR lowers the broker-dealers’ costs of funding margin 
loans, but I have not investigated the extent to which these cost savings are passed on to 
customer borrowers. 
 240. This approach is reminiscent of the Benjamin-Gullifer proposal for a bifurcated 
holding system.  See Benjamin & Gullifer, supra note 61, at 217–22, 233–36. 
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would be subject to a security interest in favor of the broker-dealer 
perfected by designation under the NPS.  Calculation of fully paid 
securities, excess margin securities, and non-excess margin securities and 
the operation of the reserve account under the CPR would be applicable to 
these synthetic margin accounts as if they were conventional margin 
accounts. 
The broker-transactor could grant a security interest in (repledge or 
rehypothecate) any of the covered securities in favor of a funds lender to 
the broker-transactor by designation perfection under the NPS while the 
investor remained the registered holder.241  For securities lending, however, 
the securities would be removed from the investor’s holdings and 
transferred to the securities borrower under the NPS.242  In this respect the 
securities lending transaction would not mimic its equivalent under the 
conventional margin account approach, which normally would not involve 
debiting (removing) the securities from the investor’s account.243  Unlike 
the repledge situation, in the case of securities lending there would be no 
basis for the investor in a direct-holding structure to retain any present 
proprietary interest in the securities loaned. 
The discussion of synthetic margin accounts under the NPS thus far 
has embraced (albeit implicitly) the simplifying assumption that the 
repledges and lending of non-excess margin securities and the withholding 
of transfers to investors in the NPS (on account of fails to receive) would 
involve securities that are identified to particular investors.  Of course, this 
is not actually how the system works.  Currently broker-dealers need not 
allocate securities that are repledged, loaned, or fail to receive securities to 
any particular customer accounts.  This reflects, at least in part, the 
convention of not debiting customers’ accounts to reflect securities that are 
 
 241. Consistent with the concept of a synthetic margin account, these repledges would be 
subject to the CPR requirements relating to the reserve account and the hypothecation 
restriction. See Mooney, supra note 66, at 173–74. 
 242. A securities borrower also could require that the securities be transferred to it by 
crediting its securities account maintained under the legacy holding system. 
 243. This deviation would be ameliorated by the creation of a corresponding “securities 
receivable” credit by the broker-dealer in favor of the investor, secured by the reserve fund, 
as discussed below in this subpart.  In a system that respects “title-transfer” security, unlike 
under the UCC, “repledge” by transfer of legal title to a funds lender could proceed as with 
securities lending under any applicable rules analogous to the CPR—removal of the 
securities from the investor’s holdings and, if applicable, a corresponding “securities 
receivable” credit reflecting the broker-dealer’s right (as debtor) of redemption or return of 
the securities upon payment of the secured obligation.  Mooney, supra note 66, at 173–74.  
Perfection of security interests in the United States by outright transfer to the creditor should 
be treated in an identical fashion to securities lending, which might require conforming 
adjustments to the CPR in this context. 
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loaned, and crediting customer accounts for securities that have not yet 
been received.  It also reflects the treatment of securities held in fungible 
bulk by broker-dealers in omnibus accounts. 
In order to replicate the current regime through the convention of 
synthetic margin accounts within the NPS, it would be necessary to adopt 
some method of allocating repledges, securities lending, and fails to receive 
to specific synthetic margin account investors of a broker-transactor.  One 
approach would be for a repledge of securities or loans of an issue to be 
allocated proportionally among all of the broker-dealer’s synthetic margin 
account investors holding that issue.244  Fails to receive might be allocated 
in similar fashion by proportional deduction from holders of securities not 
received.  But a more coherent approach for fails might be to withhold 
credits in the NPS proportionally to those that would have been made to the 
holdings of acquiring investors had the securities been received.  For 
purposes of this discussion it is not necessary to propose an optimal 
resolution of all possible approaches to these allocations.  The essential 
point is that in the direct-holding environment of the NPS, unlike under the 
legacy holding system, these allocations would be necessary. 
In the case of repledge, securities lending, and fails to receive, under 
the legacy system in the United States an entitlement holder whose 
securities are affected retains nonetheless some proprietary rights, although 
not necessarily in the securities per se.245  In the case of repledged 
securities, as with all securities in which the intermediary holds a security 
interest, the account holder has the right to a credit of the relevant 
securities, free and clear, upon satisfaction of its indebtedness to the 
intermediary (the broker-transactor margin lender).  In the case of loaned 
securities, the entitlement holder likewise has the right to the benefit of the 
loaned securities once returned and, in the meantime, the benefit of the 
cash collateral held in the reserve account.  Similarly, in the case of fails to 
receive, the entitlement holder is entitled to receive the securities once 
delivered in the settlement process.  All of these rights are reflected 
currently by an actual credit of the relevant securities in the entitlement 
holder’s securities account. 
 
 244. For example, assume there were 15 synthetic margin accounts for a broker-dealer as 
to which 20,000 A Co. shares were held by investors, with 5 investors holding 2,000 shares 
each and 10 investors holding 1,000 shares each.  If 5,000 shares were repledged by 
designation or loaned to borrowers (25% of the total A Co. shares), then 500 shares would 
be designated for or removed from each of the 2,000 share investors and 250 shares for or 
from each of the 1,000 share investors. 
 245. The entitlement holder’s rights would be those afforded by UCC Article 8 by virtue 
of the credit to its securities account and under Article 9 by virtue of its status as a debtor.  
See supra notes 33–41 (discussing security entitlements under UCC Article 8). 
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Replicating the current system through synthetic margin accounts 
under the NPS would require a method for formally reflecting these 
investor assets (i.e., the value of the analogous rights of entitlement holders 
just described).  An investor’s rights in securities subject to the broker-
transactor’s security interest and any repledges would be adequately 
memorialized by the investor’s direct holdings of the securities in the NPS.  
However, an investor’s right to the return of its proportionate allocation of 
loaned securities and to be credited with its portion of securities received 
pursuant to earlier fails are direct obligations of its synthetic margin 
account broker-transactor.  These obligations may be properly 
characterized as “securities receivables” of investors.  Each such broker-
transactor would be obliged to maintain a record of the receivables 
(deliverables, from the broker-dealer’s perspective) of each of its synthetic 
margin account investors, valued and marked-to-market daily.  As under 
the current system, a broker-dealer necessarily will know, and its records 
will reflect, these obligations and values.  The new wrinkle would be the 
maintenance of records in the NPS of each investor’s securities 
receivables.246  Mind you, this is not intermediation.  The securities 
receivables are not security entitlements and do not represent any present 
interests in the underlying securities.  They are, functionally, derivative 
contracts with values based on underlying securities to be delivered by the 
dealer-transactor in the NPS in the future.  These are obligations borne by 
an investor’s synthetic margin account broker-transactor, which for this 
purpose may be conceptualized as the “issuer” of these receivables 
(deliverables) within the NPS structure.247 
To be sure, this précis of synthetic margin accounts operating within 
the current environment of the CPR and settlement infrastructure reflects a 
complicated architecture of interrelated rights and obligations.  But the 
beneficiaries of the current intermediated holding system in the United 
States, the broker-dealers who would champion the CPR, are in no position 
to whine about complexity.  Currently, the rights of entitlement holders are 
 
 246. Given the applicable regulation and supervision of broker-dealers there would be no 
reason to mandate that the records in the NPS reflecting an investor’s holdings of securities 
receivables contain an itemization of the particular securities involved or the details of the 
underlying transactions. 
 247. Treatment of these securities receivable in an insolvency proceeding of the broker-
dealer obligor (likely under the Bankruptcy Code and the SIPA in the United States) should 
be addressed.  See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing intermediary insolvencies).  Although these 
investor securities receivable claims would not be customer claims, the investors should 
receive the benefit of the reserve fund and any backstops supporting fails to receive in the 
settlement process, to the end that they would be treated to that extent as secured creditors.  
Statutory adjustments would be needed to achieve this result. 
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intentionally, not accidentally or inadvertently, cloaked behind the blunt 
instrument of crediting securities to securities accounts and the byzantine, 
nearly impenetrable black box of the CPR.  Whether one considers this 
conception of synthetic margin accounts as a practical approach for dealing 
with several deficiencies of the current infrastructure (as I do) or a 
metaphorical thought experiment, it offers an accurate and useful (and, 
perhaps, disturbing) unveiling of the rights of entitlement holders in 
connection with margin accounts. 
 
VI. THE NEW PLATFORM AND DLT: A FINTECH PRIMORDIAL SOUP 
This Part considers the potential for adopting a DLT-based system for 
the operation of the NPS.  In particular, the discussion focuses on the 
essential functions and attributes of the NPS in the context of DLT rather 
than the details of the technology itself.  Perhaps more importantly, it also 
explains how the NPS might provide a logistical and political path (a 
metaphorical “primordial soup”248) for the ultimate adoption of DLT in the 
broader processes for trading, clearing, settlement, and holding of financial 
assets—whether or not the NPS itself were to adopt DLT either initially or 
at some future point. 
The core functions of the NPS are (i) the direct connection of 
participating investors and their securities holdings with the issuers of the 
securities, which necessarily implicates the direct connection of these 
issuers to, and their direct participation in, the NPS, (ii) the direct 
connection of investors with other investors within the NPS, which would 
accommodate inter-investor transfers of assets within the NPS, (iii) the 
direct connection of investors with their (existing or subsequently retained) 
broker-transactors within the NPS, so as to facilitate the acquisition and 
disposition of assets into and out of the NPS pursuant to market 
transactions and the existing settlement infrastructure, and (iv) the direct 
connection of the NPS (and, necessarily, its participants—the investors, 
issuers, and broker-transactors) with the existing systems for trading, 
clearing, and settlement of market transactions and with the participants in 
those systems. 
The essential attributes of the NPS are (i) a seamless, automatic 
 
 248. The metaphor, of course, refers to the theory that life on Earth began billions of 
years ago in a warm pond or ocean from chemicals that form amino acids which, in turn, 
form proteins.  The Primordial Soup Theory, PRIMORDIAL SOUP, http://leiwenwu.tripod.com
/primordials.htm [https://perma.cc/UX7K-TLDH]. 
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interface with existing settlement systems (and their participants, including 
exchanges and other trading platforms), issuers’ books (registers) for 
securities, and broker-transactors, (ii) accurate, error-free, “hack-proof,” 
definitive records of indisputable ownership of securities within NPS and 
that constitute the books (registers) of issuers, (iii) exclusive investor 
access and control over dispositions (transfers) of securities, (iv) real-time, 
free transfer of securities within the NPS or for release to a broker-
transactor (which constitute transfers on the issuers’ books) for disposition 
outside the NPS, and (v) transactions and transaction records within the 
NPS (and consequently on the issuers’ books) that would mimic precisely 
currently permissible transactions (e.g., transfers to another investor or 
security interests and repledges of securities) as permitted under the 
applicable law. 
I take no position here on the details of the technology that would 
support these functions and attributes of the NPS, including whether it 
should adopt a DLT-based system.  However, many of the characteristics 
for which DLT has been extolled would serve well these core functions and 
essential attributes.  The NPS could benefit from DLT’s potential for 
efficiency, speed, reduced transactions costs, increased accuracy, enhanced 
security, and improved regulatory compliance and oversight.249  These 
potential benefits have led Fintech proponents of DLT to shift the 
conversation away from Bitcoin and crypto-currencies and towards the 
practical utility of DLT for other, broader applications in the financial 
markets.250  One asserted appeal of DLT is that it need not be maintained in 
the traditional sense by any one central administrator, thereby eliminating 
counterparty and other intermediary risks.251  However, in the context of 
financial markets, the implementation of DLT almost certainly would 
involve a “permissioned” ledger; in the case of the NPS the participants 
would include the system operators, CSDs, broker-transactors, and other 
trusted institutions as well as issuers and investors.252  Unrestricted, 
 
 249. For a thoughtful and realistic assessment of the potential for DLT in the context of 
securities settlement and holding, see Sarah Green & Ferdisha Snagg, Intermediated 
Securities and Distributed Ledger Technology, in INTERMEDIATION AND BEYOND 338–58 
(Louise Gullifer & Jennifer Payne eds., 2019). 
 250. Id. at 341 (discussing “‘tokenization’ of securities: i.e. the use of virtual tokens to 
constitute or represent ‘traditional’ securities”). 
 251. Id. at 358 (“DLT offers the potential for major changes in the way that securities are 
both held and settled.  Primary amongst these is the possibility of reducing, or even 
eliminating, the role of intermediaries.”). 
 252. In contrast, an ‘unpermissioned’ ledger is accessible to the public and the platform 
is not controlled or regulated by any one owner.  Bitcoin is an example of an 
unpermissioned ledger.  See Tim Swanson, Consensus-as-a-Service: A Brief Report on the 
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unpermissioned consensus models similar to Bitcoin would not be likely to 
satisfy legal and regulatory concerns.253  Even so, because investors would 
have direct access to and participate in the NPS, considerable security 
concerns must be addressed.254 
Notwithstanding these DLT-related developments, expressions of 
interest, and hype, the question remains as to what role (if any) DLT could 
or should play in the NPS.  A central and distinctive attribute of DLT is the 
collective operation of a network by participants using cryptography for the 
processing and validating of transactions.255  The claim is that the 
consensus achieved through collective accounting and the application of 
complex algorithms ensures the legitimacy of transactions.  But one might 
seriously question the significance of this attribute of DLT for the operation 
of the NPS (at least as an initial, potentially interim step as envisaged here).  
In particular, the crucial input of securities into the NPS and the 
simultaneous and corresponding assignments of proprietary interests in 
securities to investors would emanate directly from the existing legacy 
settlement systems, from existing legacy issuer registers, or from banks 
holding in legacy systems. 
Nothing within the subsequent operation of the NPS could enhance 
the accuracy or validity of this central, organic input of financial assets—
which would be what it is, NPS or no NPS.  However, transactions (entries 
 
Emergence of Permissioned, Distributed Ledger Systems, GREAT WALL NUMBERS (Apr. 6, 
2015), https://www.ofnumbers.com/2015/04/06/consensus-as-a-service-a-brief-report-on-th
e-emergence-of-permissioned-distributed-ledger-systems/ [https://perma.cc/G6RK-A92M].  
Note that Geis, D&M, and PB&A also contemplate permissioned DLT platforms.  Geis, 
supra note 125, at 264; Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 15; 
Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, at 23. 
 253. Philipp Paech explained the crucial roles of law and regulation for DLT platforms 
in his important 2017 article.  Philipp Paech, The Governance of Blockchain Financial 
Networks, 80 MODERN L. REV. 1073 passim (2017). 
 254. For example, the NPS necessarily would involve participation by investors screened 
under know-your-customer rules to the extent that access would be allowed through 
permissioned broker-transactors or otherwise identified as eligible for holding in the NPS.  
See, e.g., PWC, KNOW YOUR CUSTOMER: QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE (2016), https://www.pwc
.com/gx/en/financial-services/publications/assets/pwc-anti-money-laundering-2016.pdf [http 
s://perma.cc/BZ2K-4F9Q].  Obviously, cybersecurity is a concern, but there is no reason 
why a move to a DLT-based system would necessarily increase that risk.  This issue is one 
of many for the RFP to FinTech. 
 255. DLT systems all feature a form of asymmetric key cryptography, which requires the 
use of public-private keys for the submission of data.  See HARISH NATARAJAN, SOLVEJ 
KARLA KRAUSE & HELEN LUSKIN GRADSTEIN, WORLD BANK GRP., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER 
TECHNOLOGY (DLT) AND BLOCKCHAIN (2017), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1
77911513714062215/pdf/122140-WP-PUBLIC-Distributed-Ledger-Technology-and-Bloc
kchain-Fintech-Notes.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BTW-LSYQ]. 
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of data) following and building upon these inputs might well benefit from a 
DLT-based system.  Investors necessarily would have access to the NPS 
and the ability to execute transfers within the system.  I leave to others the 
assessment of the respective roles of DLT and legacy technology in this 
setting.  It may well be that legacy technology would be up to the task of 
performing the essential functions of the NPS, at least as contemplated here 
for its initial functions.256  For now, it is sufficient to issue an RFP to the 
Fintech community to address the goals and functions of the NPS.257 
That said, it is necessary to address the issue of exclusive investor 
access and control over securities and the potential implications of DLT for 
that core attribute of the NPS.  Were the NPS to embrace DLT as the 
technology for acquiring and disposing of securities—assets that have an 
existence exogenous to the NPS—the interests in securities held through 
the NPS would be a form of digital assets (or cryptoassets).  
Notwithstanding oft-repeated and hyped rhetorical and ideological 
aspirations for DLT to eliminate intermediation in financial markets, 
experience has shown that this claim for DLT has not been realized in the 
context of digital assets.  For many investors the only practical means of 
holding digital assets is through some form of custodial relationship—
intermediated holding.  This is because most investors could not practically 
deal with the unwieldy and unfriendly public-private key architecture that 
has become the norm for direct (as opposed to intermediated) access and 
control over digital assets in the DLT environment.258  Implementation of 
 
 256. See DTCC Report, supra note 14, at 20 (describing how [current financial 
infrastructures] have endured for decades and operate seamlessly and efficiently to ensure 
the smooth operation of the world’s financial markets.  Any failure in the highly 
orchestrated processing of transactions that occurs seamlessly every day could literally grind 
the world’s financial markets to a halt and disrupt economies globally.  Significant change 
to this infrastructure must be carefully considered.).  DTCC’s conclusion is that a mature, 
supported, integrated distributed ledger technology has the potential to help improve a 
number of existing financial market infrastructure limitations.  However, it may not be the 
solution to every problem because there may be alternative opportunities to lower the costs 
and risks of current infrastructure by standardizing industry workflows and expanding the 
use of cloud technologies. 
 257. See Mooney, supra note 257, at 2 (“Those experienced with secured transactions in 
the credit markets . . . may have much to offer by way of identifying the goals and 
requirements that registries must address.  But once these needs are identified, it is for 
fintech to determine how the application of technology might address these needs.  Secured 
transactions experts are well positioned to issue to the fintech sector metaphorical requests 
for proposals for technology-related structural reforms of secured transactions regimes.  It is 
up to the fintech sector to devise and propose such reforms—or concede that it is unable to 
do so”). 
 258. For a brief overview of issues and problems relating to custody of and access to 
digital assets, see Henry Chong & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The New Intermediation: Digital 
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the NPS would require that investors have accessible and user-friendly 
direct and exclusive control over securities held in the system.  This 
challenge must be met whether or not the NPS adopts a DLT-based 
approach.  But it is plausible that developments facilitating better 
disintermediated access to digital assets would have utility for the NPS 
even if it did not adopt DLT for its operations.259 
The NPS in its initial modality as envisaged here would leave much of 
the legacy trading and settlement systems intact.  Business, cultural, legal, 
technological, and other barriers to direct holding could be overcome in a 
non-disruptive way through implementation of the NPS.  Even if the NPS 
were initially implemented by employing legacy technology, it could 
nonetheless serve as a primordial soup for a more full-blown DLT-based 
system covering the broad range of financial market processes—trading, 
clearing, settlement, and holding.  This role of the NPS in “priming the 
pump” for the application of DLT to a more comprehensive system would 
derive from and build upon the NPS function of directly connecting issuers 
of securities, investors, broker-transactors, banks, and CSD/CCP settlement 
systems. 
As discussed in Part VII, whether NPS is implemented should be 
influenced substantially by conclusions of regulators and market 
participants that the NPS is justified on a cost-benefit basis by its goals of 
addressing the significant problems of intermediary risk, custody-chain 
risk, and the other risks and costs of intermediated holding.  But another 
stand-alone and important influence should be the prime-the-pump, 
primordial-soup rationale for the NPS just outlined.260  This potential 
transformational role of the NPS in bringing together all of the significant 
market participants and institutions is of central importance. 
 
Assets (June 26, 2019) (unpublished presentation) (on file with author).  See also Jonathan 
B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, New Special Study of the Securities Markets: Financial 
Intermediaries 3–5 (July 14, 2017), https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsi
tes/capital-markets/berk-vanbinsbergen-final_draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK99-ET5L] 
(illustrating that over the past few decades in the United States the share of corporate 
equities held by households and nonprofits has declined substantially and the holdings by 
institutional investors have correspondingly increased).  Although this development may 
ameliorate the potential problems of access to digital assets in a direct-holding system such 
as the NPS, there remain many non-institutional holders of intermediated securities. 
 259. See Seth Rosenblatt & Jason Cipriani, Two-factor Authentication: What You Need 
to Know (FAQ), CNET (June 15, 2015), https://www.cnet.com/news/two-factor-authenticati
on-what-you-need-to-know-faq/ (discussing the two-factor identification process in the e-
voting project led by Nasdaq and Tallinn Stock Exchange). 
 260. See infra Part VII (noting that the adoption or even potential adoption of a DLT-
based NPS (or other transparent or direct-holding infrastructure) could empower new 
stakeholders that could affect the political economy analysis of reforms). 
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VII. POLITICAL ECONOMY CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTING NEW 
PLATFORM SYSTEM: OPPOSITION OF ENTRENCHED INTERESTS, 
PATH DEPENDENCE, AND STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES 
There is no doubt that intermediaries, including CSDs, strongly favor 
maintaining the status quo in markets that feature securities holding 
infrastructures embracing deep intermediation and omnibus securities 
accounts.  This Part considers this phenomenon as well as two additional 
structural artifacts that discourage transparency and direct holding reforms.  
One such structural impediment to direct holding of debt securities in the 
United States and Europe is the prevailing structure of debt obligations 
evidenced by “global certificates” registered to a CSD or nominee of a 
CSD.  Another obstacle is the requirement that investment companies in 
the United States hold securities with bank custodians.  These examples of 
mandatory intermediation have not been addressed by earlier commentary 
on disintermediation.  I outline below plausible means for modifying and 
overcoming these impediments. 
Nougayrède offers an excellent and concise overview of the political 
economy aspects of potential reforms.261  She describes the many bases for 
securities industry opposition (focusing primarily on Europe) to increased 
transparency (“expanded account segregation”) and the industry’s 
preference for omnibus accounting structures.262  It is a safe assumption 
that this opposition would be even stronger in the case of proposals for 
direct holding.  She then explains the many reasons why reforms that 
would impose transparency would be difficult, canvassing the views of a 
variety of observers.  Recommendations for reform by experts external to 
the industry would confront “strong-form legal path dependence.”263  She 
notes Donald’s explanation that disintermediating issuer registration of 
shares would involve a clash between arguments based on disparate 
disciplines and “path-induced perceptions of ‘normal’ mechanisms.”264 
But the core obstacle to transparency and direct-holding reforms is the 
influence of the powerful intermediaries and CSDs.265  Nougayrède 
 
 261. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 308–11. 
 262. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 291–95. 
 263. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 308 (citing and quoting Mark Roe, Chaos and 
Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 651–52, 659 (1996)). 
 264. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 308–09 (citing and quoting Donald, supra note 87, at 
99). 
 265. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 309.  See also Kathryn Judge, Intermediary 
Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (2015) (explaining negative influences of intermediaries); 
Milne, supra note 67, at 352 (observing that the complexity the current infrastructure 
“entrenches the market power of securities brokers, at the expense of higher charges to final 
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concludes that reform would require a transformation of the political 
economy that would involve a greater role for experts outside the industry 
and a quantification of the costs and benefits of reform.266  She offers a 
useful menu of policy considerations that ought to figure into the analysis.  
These include the issue of investor identification versus anonymity, the 
regulatory goal of stability, and wider social interests such as money 
laundering, terrorist financing, sanctions compliance, and tax evasion and 
revenue concerns.267 
Although Nougayrède expresses optimism for reforms, she does not 
identify a clear path forward.268  Others, including D&M, have recognized 
that, given the prevailing headwinds, reforms will require some form of 
top-down, regulatory intervention.  I agree.  D&M recognize that the 
current holding system in the United States works well for its owners, the 
intermediaries, but not for investors and issuers.269  For that reason they 
direct their proposal for a DLT-based direct-holding system270 “mainly to 
regulators, whose duties run to the broader market, rather than to the direct 
heirs of legacy arrangements and of the rents accrued from the same.”271 
Donald’s description and assessment of the pathetic saga of the DTCC 
Direct Registration System (DRS) is illuminating.272  As Donald explains, 
this was originally “an issuer-driven project designed to restore 
transparency and shareholder communications.”273  However, as a result of 
 
investors”). 
 266. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 309. 
 267. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 309–11. 
 268. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 312. 
 269. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 23–25, 38; see also 
Donald, supra note 87, at 88–93 (discussing current holding system). 
 270. See supra Part IV (discussing the D&M proposal).  Although I expressed strong 
criticism of the D&M proposal there, I strongly agree with Donald’s critique of the role and 
influence of intermediaries. 
 271. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 38. 
 272. Donald, supra note 87, at 89–91. 
 273. Donald, supra note 87, at 89.  By way of background, in 1990 the G-30 U.S. 
Working Group considered a proposal that contemplated a Direct Registration Clearing 
System (DRCS).  For a description and analysis, see Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Property, 
Credit, and Regulation Meet Information Technology: Clearance and Settlement in the 
Securities Markets, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 142–45, 149–55 (1992).  DRCS would 
have provided an optional direct connection between issuers and their shareholders and 
would have enhanced the roles of transfer agents beyond the traditional direct holding 
structures.  Id. at 149–50.  Issuers and their transfer agents favored the DRCS proposal but 
DTC and broker-dealers opposed the proposal.  Id.  DTC was concerned about the high 
costs of automation for including a large number of transfer agents in the system.  Id. at 150 
n.65.  The broker-dealers apparently viewed it as a threat to their business models, which 
rely on more-or-less “captive” customers.  They apparently feared that more portable 
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DTC control, DRS is now “a service option of DTCC, to which DTC 
regulates access and for which issuers now pay fees.”274  As Donald 
concludes, the DRS now “offers little more than a parking lot for 
untransferable shares—if a shareholder wants liquidity, he must place the 
shares back” into the system.275  The DRS example underscores the point 
made in Part II: The intermediaries and CSDs have little incentive to 
remove obstacles to portability of securities in and out of the system, and 
they have every incentive to keep securities in the intermediated systems 
that they control.  On the other hand, when it would increase the efficiency 
and lower the costs of the specific relationship between DTC itself and 
issuers of securities, DTC has indeed invested in reforms and innovation 
affecting direct-holding relationships.276 
Also reflecting the dominance of the DTCC, debt securities held in the 
DTCC system in the United States typically adopt DTC’s “book-entry 
only” (BEO) structure.  Under this structure the securities are registered in 
the name of DTC’s nominee, Cede & Co., and a global certificate is issued 
for the aggregate principal amount of an issue and deposited with DTC.277  
The key attributes of the BEO structure are that “(i) physical certificates are 
not available to investors and (ii) DTC, through its nominee, Cede & Co., 
will hold the entire balance of the offering.”278  Obviously, BEO securities 
 
securities would allow customers to change their brokerage relationships more easily.  Id. at 
150 n.68.  Notwithstanding this opposition, in 1994 the SEC asked the securities industry to 
consider the development of a direct registration system that would employ uncertificated 
securities.  In 2006, the New York Stock Exchange amended its Listed Company Manual to 
require listed companies to make their securities eligible for DRS.  NYSE, Listed Company 
Manual §§ 501.00 (listing mandatory eligibility of listed securities for DRS), 601.01(A)(13) 
(stating that listed company’s transfer agent must be eligible for DRS); see Paul Weiss 
Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP, NYSE Proposes Amendments to Mandate Eligibility to 
Participate in a Direct Registration System (June 20, 2006) (describing requirement for 
public companies to make securities eligible for DRS).  NASDAQ adopted a similar rule: 
NASDAQ Equity Rule 5255. 
 274. Donald, supra note 87, at 89. 
 275. Donald, supra note 87, at 91. 
 276. See The FAST Program, DTCC, http://www.dtcc.com/settlement-and-asset-services 
/agent-services/fast [https://perma.cc/N3TV-BV44] (describing DTC’s Fast Automated 
Securities Transfer Program (FAST) as “a contract between DTC and transfer agents that 
eliminates the movement of physical securities by allowing agents to act as custodians for 
DTC”). 
 277. Sample Offering Document Language Describing Book-Entry Only Issuance, DTC 
(June 2013), www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/legal/issue.../Sample-Language.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/CXQ6-42FE].  However, if the aggregate principal amount of an issue 
exceeds $500 million, additional certificates of $500 million or the remaining amount of the 
issue will be issued.  Id. 
 278. DTC, OPERATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, REQUIREMENTS FOR BOOK-ENTRY ONLY 
(“BEO”) SECURITIES (2019), www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/legal/issue.../operati
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would be incompatible with the direct-holding structure of the NPS.  
However, it is not unusual for trust indentures governing debt securities in 
the United States to permit an issuer and an indenture trustee to amend the 
indentures if the security holders would not be adversely affected.279  Given 
this flexibility, it is quite plausible that the SEC could mandate that issuers 
of BEO securities undertake best efforts to amend the terms of the 
securities so as to permit beneficial holders to elect to hold through the 
NPS (or another direct-holding mechanism).280 
The use of bank custodians for holding securities by investment 
companies and investment advisors in the United States is another example 
of mandatory intermediation.  Pursuant to the custody requirement of 
section 17(f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940,281 “nearly all 
investment companies use a bank custodian” for holding securities.282  This 
 
onal-arrangements.pdf [https://perma.cc/WY9Q-C4RS]. 
 279. See, e.g., ABA Ad Hoc Comm. for Revision of the 1983 Model Simplified 
Indenture, Revised Model Simplified Indenture, 55 BUS. LAW. 1115, 1146 (2000) (“The 
Company and the Trustee may amend this Indenture or the Securities without the consent of 
any Securityholder: . . . to make any change that does not adversely affect the rights of any 
Securityholder.”) (emphasis added); NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, FORM INDENTURE § 
10.01, https://www.nabl.org/portals/0/documents/nablformalreportsmodeldocs-nablformtrus
tindenture.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5R9-JNCJ] (“The Issuer and the Trustee may from time to 
time and at any time enter into trust indentures supplemental to this Indenture, without the 
consent of or notice to any Bondholder, to effect any one or more of the following:. . . . 
make any other change herein that is determined by the Trustee to be not materially adverse 
to the interests of the Bondholders [and which does not involve a change described in 
Section 10.02 requiring consents of specific Bondholders.”) (emphasis added).  For similar 
provisions under English law bonds, see Debt Capital Markets: Trustees—Overview, 
LEXISPSL, https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexispsl/bankingandfinance/document/391289/57
FJ-2NP1-F185-X1W1-00000-00/Debt_capital_markets__trustees_overview# (“A trustee 
usually has discretion to. . .agree to a modification (proposed by the issuer) to the provisions 
of the trust deed . . . without the consent or sanction of the holders of the debt securities 
(provided the modification . . . is not materially prejudicial to the interests of the holders of 
the debt securities).”). 
 280. Arguably permitting optional direct holding in the NPS could have adverse 
consequences for those beneficial holders who continue to hold indirectly.  However, a 
carefully constructed amendment could avoid that result.  For example, even if there were 
an explicit or implicit obligation of debt security holders to share ratably with other security 
holders any non-ratable recoveries from the issuer, that obligation could be imposed on NPS 
direct holders. 
 281. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(f) (2018). 
 282. THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., 1 REGULATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES § 8.02[2][a] 
(2014).  While it is also permissible for investment companies to use broker-dealers as 
custodians and to “self-custody,” those alternatives currently involve burdensome 
requirements that make them impractical for most investment companies.  See id. § 
8.02[2][b] (broker-dealer custody), (c) (self-custody).  Similar requirements exist for 
investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-18b 
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custody requirement arose out of Congressional concerns about investment 
company management abuses such as commingling of company and 
personal assets.283  While suggesting that the SEC should permit non-
custodial holding284 through something like the NPS might seem radical, in 
actuality whatever services and monitoring that bank custodians currently 
provide could be provided under a direct-holding scenario.  There is no 
reason why a bank custodian need be an intermediary in the chain of title 
for these purposes.  For example, the SEC could condition an investment 
company’s direct holding under the NPS on the retention of a bank for 
providing services (other than intermediated holding) essentially identical 
to what bank custodians currently offer.285 
The foregoing suggests that implementing disintermediation286 most 
likely would require regulatory intervention.  The following discussion 
proceeds on the plausible working assumption that the SEC would be the 
appropriate agency to institute and coordinate such reforms.287  Academic 
literature may offer insights concerning potential intervention on the 
 
(2018); see Investor Bulletin: Custody of Your Investment Assets, SEC (Mar. 1, 2018), https:
//www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/bulletincustody.htm [https://perma.cc/T7GX-JDF7] 
(describing safeguards of the “custody rule”). 
 283. THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 282, § 8.02[1].  Given the risks that 
intermediated holding imposes on investors, it is ironic (to say the least) that the custody 
requirement has been thought to promote investor welfare. 
 284. The Investment Company Act permits self-custody “in accordance with such rules 
and regulations or orders as the Commission may from time to time prescribe for the 
protection of investors.”  15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(f)(1) (2018).  Recently a petition to the SEC 
for rulemaking suggested that the SEC consider “allowing issuers or trading platforms to 
use blockchain technology in lieu of banks as custodians,” which “could significantly 
streamline securities trading and reduce transaction costs, producing savings for investors.”  
Templum Mkts., LLC & Templum, Inc., Letter to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 18, 
2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-736.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4YW-W
LWB]. 
 285. During a meeting on February 22, 2018 that Thomas Keijser and I held with staff of 
a global bank custodian, the staff expressed the view that the bank provides services through 
the mechanism of intermediated holding of securities for its institutional investor clients 
(which would include investment companies) because the currently applicable intermediated 
holding systems make such holding the only practical alternative. 
 286. Reference here is to disintermediation as a very general concept, including a direct 
holding infrastructure (such as the NPS) or some form of transparent system as well as the 
amelioration of the two mandatory intermediation obstacles just discussed. 
 287. The SEC’s mandate would include taking into account costs and benefits outside of 
those directly impacting the securities holding system, such as AML, in considering a 
fundamental shift toward requiring or providing incentives for more direct holding and 
transparency.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2018) (indicating that the SEC’s mandate includes 
protection of “interstate commerce, the national credit, the Federal taxing power . . . the 
national banking system and Federal Reserve System”). 
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discrete issues addressed here.  For example, in their recent article Chris 
Brummer and Yesha Yadav argue that the regulatory oversight of financial 
innovation involves a “policy trilemma.”288  They claim that at best 
regulators can achieve only two out of the three regulatory goals of 
providing clear rules, maintaining market integrity, and encouraging 
financial innovation.289  They advise regulators to avoid “the most extreme 
trade-offs” and to “moderate opportunities and risks among the three policy 
goals.”290  More specifically, they advocate “supplemental strategies” that 
would encourage cooperation among domestic agencies, the setting of 
international standards, and the “private self-governance of emerging 
technologies.”291  These valuable injunctions no doubt have utility for 
regulators.  But this relatively high level of abstraction provides less 
guidance to the SEC on the specifics of securities holding infrastructures. 
David Wishnick’s nascent research on the financial infrastructure for 
securities settlement is more promising.292  Wishnick surveys the 
development of the securities settlement and holding infrastructure in the 
United States.293  He analyzes the SEC’s authority over “back-office” 
reforms and offers concrete suggestions for SEC involvement.294  In 
particular, Wishnick suggests that “the SEC should consider making use of 
the power to convene an expert Market Transactions Advisory Committee” 
(MTAC), noting that the SEC has not used this power since the “early 
1990s.”295  He astutely points out that the advisory committee approach 
could provide “a focal point for interest groups other than the DTCC 
membership to coordinate around, thereby changing the dynamics of the 
 
 288. Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadov, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. 
L.J. 235 passim (2019). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at 297. 
 291. Id. 
 292. David A. Wishnick, Innovation and Securities Settlement Infrastructure (June 20, 
2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 293. Id. at 4–14 
 294. Id. at 25–27. 
 295. Id. at 29.  He also suggests that the SEC make use of information that is to be 
provided in the report due in September 2020 on the costs and benefits of the 2017 
implementation of T+2 settlement and (consistent with the Brummer and Yadov 
recommendations) that it engage in coordination with Treasury and the Fed.  Id.  The SEC’s 
power to invoke an advisory committee is provided in section 17A(f) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.  15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(f) (2018).  For background on the Market 
Transactions Advisory Committee that began its work in 1991 (I was member), see 
Mooney, Individuals, supra note 105, at 564–72.  As detailed there, Section 17A(f) followed 
a draft bill providing for an advisory committee prepared by Robert Mendelson, Egon 
Guttman, and me in 1988.  Id. at 564, 566–67. 
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process.”296  This is exactly the sort of opening for influence of experts 
outside of the intermediary/CSD community which Nougayrède suggests 
may be necessary for meaningful reform.297  Even without the SEC’s 
reconstitution of the MTAC, the currently active Investor Advisory 
Committee (IAC) could play an important role in the process.  The IAC has 
a fairly wide charge to evaluate potential improvements in the securities 
markets, and it has weighed in on securities settlement in the past 
(advocating for T+1 settlement).298 
An SEC advisory committee today, however, would face somewhat 
greater obstacles than those confronting the MTAC of the 1990s.  The 
earlier incarnation of the MTAC, and in general the reform efforts of the 
late 1980s and early 1990s culminating in revised UCC Article 8 and the 
federal TRADES regulations, generally accepted the deeply intermediated 
settlement and holding infrastructure as it then existed.  It focused on 
rationalizing the private-law rules for accommodating that infrastructure.299  
A current SEC advisory committee might instead question and potentially 
support reforms that would disrupt the current infrastructure.  This potential 
disruption likely would prompt opposition from the intermediary (broker-
dealers and banks) and DTCC sectors of the industry.  But an investigation 
by an advisory committee with expert members and advisors external to the 
industry would offer legitimacy, independence, and balance to counter 
industry opposition, as contemplated by Nougayrède and Wishnick.300  
Moreover, prospects for a DLT-based infrastructure (Fintech inspired or 
otherwise) could energize and empower new stakeholders that might 
 
 296. Wishnick, supra note 292, at 29. 
 297. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 309. 
 298. See SEC, Investor Advisory Committee, Recommendation of the Investor Advisory 
Committee: Shortening the Trade Settlement Cycle in U.S. Financial Markets (Feb. 12, 
2015), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/settlement-cycle-re
commendation-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2EP-GURU] (detailing the recommendation of 
the Investor Advisory Committee on shortening the settlement cycle to a two-day settlement 
period). 
 299. See generally Mooney, Individuals, supra note 105, at 559–76.  That is not to say, 
however, that the process was without controversy.  See, e.g., id. at 571 n.89 (quoting 
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Good Faith Transferees of U.S. Treasury Securities and Other 
Weird Ideas: Making Federal Commercial Law, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 723 (1993)) (“It 
is unfortunate that busy professionals must use valuable time to review and comment upon 
the 1992 Proposed Regulations when that time might be more usefully spent revising Article 
8.”). 
 300. The legitimacy and influence of an advisory committee also would be enhanced by 
formal and informal participation and support from governmental bodies such as the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council and the Securities Investor Protection Corporation and 
from interest groups such as the American Association of Individual Investors, the 
Association of Institutional Investors, and the Council of Institutional Investors. 
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provide a counterbalance to the influence of legacy sectors.301  Of course, 
an advisory committee would engage in its own careful analysis of 
potential costs and benefits of infrastructure reforms.  Although the task 
would be challenging, addressing industry complexity should be a high 
priority for expert bodies in an administrative state. 
Identifying and securing an appropriate forum for consideration of the 
prospects for infrastructure reform would be a useful, indeed essential, first 
step toward implementation.  Given a proper forum and adequate 
institutional backing, perhaps a consensus among stakeholders might be 
forged or at least significant support might emerge for a more formal 
review process.  The Business Law Section of the American Bar 
Association would be an excellent candidate for providing an informed and 
influential forum for consideration of infrastructure reforms.  Most relevant 
stakeholder interests are well represented within the Section.  Moreover, 
the Section has an enviable track record as an honest broker in law 
reform.302 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Intermediated holding imposes substantial risks and costs.  Even 
though these risks are fairly well managed by modern systems, this 
management also imposes substantial costs that are ultimately borne by 
investors and issuers.  These deeply intermediated holding structures 
primarily benefit intermediaries (brokers, banks, CSDs, and other 
settlement-related organizations) that control the infrastructures and that 
are resistant to changes that would undermine these benefits. 
Disintermediation likely would require regulatory intervention.  
Proposed reforms that would limit the disruption of current market 
practices might encourage such intervention and blunt opposition.  
Providing for an optional direct holding structure while preserving current 
regimes for trading and settlement would offer the best prospect for near-
term reform.  This approach also would create a “primordial soup” for 
more extensive future reforms of trading and settlement systems.  The NPS 
proposal outlined here meets these needs.  But I reiterate that the NPS is 
only a proxy for a disintermediated system that would meet the functional 
 
 301. Cf. Mooney, supra note 89, at 541, 545 (arguing that the emergence of Fintech 
interest in DLT make this a propitious time for considering basic changes in securities 
holding infrastructures). 
 302. For example, the Section played a significant role in the process leading to the 
major revision of UCC Article 8 and the federal regulations for book-entry government 
securities in the early 1990s.  See Mooney, Individuals, supra note 105, at 560–74. 
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goals to which the NPS aspires.  The actual attributes of a reformed 
infrastructure could result only from intensive deliberations among all 
stakeholders.  No single proposal could reasonably aspire to foretell the 
details of the infrastructure that might emerge. 
This article makes several important contributions.  It outlines 
functionally the goals and features of the NPS direct holding system, 
including acquisition, disposition, financing, investor rights, cross-border 
issues, and market practices.  This amounts to an RFP for Fintech to 
achieve results necessary for an effective, safe, and efficient holding 
system.  Moreover, it explores political economy issues and challenges for 
actual implementation of disintermediation in holding systems.  In 
particular, unlike some earlier proposals, it anticipates pushback from 
powerful interests supporting the status quo and offers anticipatory 
rebuttals.  This approach forecloses industry criticism that it fails to 
appreciate “how the system works,” that it is “impractical,” that it would 
disrupt important aspects of financial markets, and that it is “utopian” or 
“pie in sky.”  Other reform advocacy that fails to anticipate such objections 
is wanting, self-impeaching, and may actually undermine reform efforts.  
The article also highlights the important distinction, often overlooked, 
between merely transparent securities holding systems and direct-holding 
infrastructures.  Moreover, it finds the other proposals for reforming 
financial infrastructure examined here wanting for their advocacy of DLT-
based solutions without a careful comparative assessment of legacy 
technology. 
The article also explores and identifies several problems imposed by 
intermediated holding that the NPS would resolve or improve by focusing 
on post-settlement intermediated holding.  These include intermediary risk 
(including custody-chain risk), which the article puts front and center, the 
exercise of investor rights, protection for the rights of creditors seeking 
attachment of securities, and clunky private-law rules spawned by 
intermediated holding.  It also explains how the NPS could preserve and 
deal with important market functions and practices and overcome 
impediments to direct holding reforms.  For example, it considers the 
impact of reform on the use of securities (margin lending, securities 
lending, rehypothecation), various nontransparency costs (AML, sanctions 
compliance, taxation), and mandatory intermediation (CSD held debt 
securities and bank custodians for investment companies). 
Unlike earlier efforts, this article provides a more complete menu of 
problems that an appropriate disintermediated holding infrastructure could 
resolve or ameliorate.  It offers a set of anticipatory responses to likely 
objections to the NPS or other proposals for transparency or direct holding 
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that other proponents have largely ignored.  And it presents a roadmap for a 
cost-benefit analysis that would take into account broader conceptions of 
social welfare than typically are invoked in discussions of financial 
infrastructure.303  In sum, Fintech may offer pathways to direct holding, 
elimination of post-settlement intermediary risk, and remedies for the 
various other problems spawned by deep intermediation of securities 
holding and nontransparency while also preserving (or even enhancing) the 
flexibility and efficiency offered by current legacy infrastructures.  
However, until now Fintech has not been asked for holistic solutions for 
achieving these desirable and needed results. 
 
 
 303. See Christopher Twemlow, Why Are Securities Held in Intermediated Form, in 
INTERMEDIATION AND BEYOND 85–107 (Louise Gullifer & Jennifer Payne eds., 2019) 
(offering a thorough, careful, and cogent articulation of the justifications for and benefits of 
intermediated holding).  However, Twemlow’s defense is grounded on path-dependent 
assumptions about existing conditions and therefore is not responsive to the claims in 
support of the NPS made here.  Ultimately policy makers must make empirical assumptions 
and determinations. 
